Investigation Summary
The flight was a specialized doors-off photo tour where passengers were permitted to sit on the floor and hang their legs outside the aircraft. To prevent falls, FlyNYON equipped passengers with supplemental harnesses consisting of a construction-grade full-body harness attached to the aircraft via a tether and a locking carabiner. During the flight, a passenger in the front seat leaned back to take photographs, causing his tether to hang loosely near the floor-mounted controls. As he sat back up, the tether snagged the emergency fuel shutoff lever, pulling it to the closed position. This immediately starved the engine of fuel. The pilot, initially unaware of the snag, attempted to restart the engine and eventually realized the lever had been moved. Although he managed to restore power, the helicopter was already too low to recover. The subsequent capsize was likely exacerbated by issues with the emergency flotation system; while the pilot activated the floats, investigators and experts noted the aircraft rolled inverted in the 3-knot current of the East River, with some observers suggesting the right-side floats may not have provided adequate buoyancy.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB adopted Aircraft Accident Report 19-04 on December 10, 2019. The probable cause was the use of a supplemental passenger restraint system (SPRS) that caught on the floor-mounted engine controls, leading to an inadvertent engine shutdown. Contributing to the fatalities was the design of the supplemental harnesses, which lacked a quick-release mechanism, trapping the passengers in the sinking aircraft. The NTSB also cited Liberty Helicopters' and NYONair's deficient safety management and the FAA's inadequate oversight of Part 91 revenue operations. A significant factor in the severity of the accident was the rapid capsizing of the helicopter due to the partial inflation of the emergency flotation system.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Licensed commercial pilot since September 2011. Total flight experience as of the accident was 3,157 hours, with 487 hours in the AS350.
Systems & Failure Modes
Emergency Fuel Shutoff Lever
A floor-mounted control designed to cut fuel to the engine in emergencies; its placement made it susceptible to being snagged by loose items or clothing.
Supplemental Passenger Restraint System (SPRS)
Non-FAA approved harnesses provided by the tour operator to prevent passengers from falling out during doors-off flights; they lacked quick-release capability.
Emergency Flotation System
Skid-mounted floats intended to keep the helicopter upright after a water landing; the system failed to prevent the aircraft from capsizing.
Interesting Facts
- 01The passengers were wearing supplemental harnesses that required a cutting tool or unscrewing a carabiner to release.
- 02The pilot was the only person on board not wearing a supplemental harness, allowing him to escape.
- 03The emergency fuel shutoff lever on the AS350 B2 was known to be vulnerable to inadvertent activation.
- 04The helicopter sank in just 11 seconds after hitting the water.
- 05A jury in 2024 awarded $116 million to a victim's family, finding FlyNYON, Liberty Helicopters, and Dart Aerospace liable.
Safety Actions & Advisories
FAA Emergency Order of Prohibition
The FAA issued an emergency order prohibiting doors-off flights using supplemental restraints that cannot be released quickly without tools.
NTSB Recommendation ASR-18-02
Recommended the prohibition of open-door flights using harness systems that do not allow for rapid release with minimal difficulty.
NTSB Recommendation A-19-32
The NTSB recommended that Airbus Helicopters modify the floor-mounted fuel shutoff lever in AS350-series helicopters to protect it from inadvertent activation due to external influences.
NTSB Recommendation A-19-24
The NTSB recommended that the FAA modify the supplemental passenger restraint system (SPRS) approval process to require specific aircraft authorization, evaluation of entanglement risks during egress, and interference with aircraft controls.
NTSB Recommendation A-19-28
The NTSB recommended that the FAA require all commercial air tour operators, regardless of their operating rule, to implement a safety management system.