Investigation Summary
The TAIID interim report (A-24/23, ref. 1A-242, 20 December 2024) is factual only. It records a double click on the CVR at 03:17:30 and both hydraulic system B pumps found off at 03:17:34, accompanied by an autopilot disconnect; it does not attribute that selection to either pilot. The flaps are powered by hydraulic system B (report section 1.6.3), so they did not extend when flaps 5 was called at 03:24:29. The co-pilot recognised that the flaps were still retracted at 03:27:56, the stick shaker and EGPWS activated, a go-around was called at 03:28:02 and the aircraft struck the ground at 03:28:08. Both engines were producing power at impact, above 90% N1 during the go-around, and there were two failed attempts to re-engage autopilot B. The FDR shows the engine anti-ice switches were never engaged despite two crew discussions and the captain's confirmation at 03:22:57; all anti-ice switches were found off, and icing conditions existed (overcast at 700 ft, temperature around +1/-1 C). In the wreckage the hydraulic system B switches were off and system A on, system B fluid was near full with no indication of a leak, the flap actuators were retracted and the flap handle was forward of the flap-zero gate. There was no in-flight fire. The aircraft carried 362 kg of lithium-ion batteries and 200 kg of dry ice and no cargo shift was found, which is relevant to the sabotage speculation that followed; Lithuania's Prosecutor General's Office said in December 2024 and again on 26 March 2025 that it had found no evidence of sabotage.
Final Conclusions
No cause has been established. The interim report of 20 December 2024 is factual and contains no conclusions. An Interim Statement of 18 November 2025 says the investigation continues and that a final report is expected within months.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
48-year-old male; also had ATR-72 experience.
First Officer
34-year-old male; pilot flying at the time of the accident.
Systems & Failure Modes
Hydraulic System B
Provides pressure for the trailing edge flaps and other flight controls. The interim report records that it was deactivated and that the aircraft was flaps-up; it does not state a causal link between the two.
Engine Anti-Ice
System intended to prevent ice buildup. The interim report notes that an anti-ice selection coincided with the autopilot disconnect and that the anti-ice and hydraulic switches share the overhead P5 panel; the suggestion that switch proximity caused the error comes from media and prosecutor statements, not the investigation.
EGPWS
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System; 'Sink Rate' and 'Pull Up' alerts were recorded seconds before impact.
Interesting Facts
- 01The trailing edge flaps are powered by hydraulic system B (interim report section 1.6.3), so they were unavailable once its pumps went off.
- 02The CVR records a double click at 03:17:30 and both hydraulic B pumps off at 03:17:34; the report does not attribute the selection to either pilot.
- 03The engine anti-ice switches were never engaged despite two crew discussions and the captain's confirmation at 03:22:57; all were found off in icing conditions (overcast 700 ft, +1/-1 C).
- 04In the wreckage hydraulic B switches were off and A on, system B fluid was near full with no leak indication, flap actuators retracted and the flap handle forward of the flap-zero gate.
- 05The two survivors besides the co-pilot were company employees travelling as passengers, not cargo attendants.
- 06Both engines were producing power at impact, above 90% N1 on the go-around; two attempts to re-engage autopilot B failed.
- 07The cargo included 362 kg of lithium-ion batteries and 200 kg of dry ice; no cargo shift and no in-flight fire were found.
- 08The Prosecutor General's Office, not the safety investigation, reported no evidence of sabotage (December 2024 and 26 March 2025).
Safety Actions & Advisories
TAIID Interim Report, 20 December 2024
Source ↗Lithuania's Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Division published a factual interim report (A-24/23, ref. 1A-242) with no analysis, conclusions or cause.
Interim Statement, 18 November 2025
Source ↗The investigation continues; a final report is expected within months.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the wikidata coordinate.