Investigation Summary
The accident occurred in the Western sector of the Krasnodar air traffic control center. The Yak-40 (Flight S-31) entered the sector at 13:30:44 at 5,700 meters. Although it was scheduled to descend according to its flight plan, the controller, who had been on duty for over six hours and was preoccupied with other traffic, permitted it to maintain its altitude. Simultaneously, the An-24 (Flight 7957) entered the same sector at the same altitude. The controller cleared the An-24 to proceed toward Anapa while maintaining 5,700 meters, effectively placing it on a collision course with the Yak-40. Neither crew detected the other in time to avoid the impact. The aircraft collided head-on, severing their tail sections and causing both to break apart before falling into the sea.
Final Conclusions
The primary cause was a gross violation of aircraft separation rules by the air traffic controller. Contributing factors included the controller's fatigue and high workload, as well as a lack of situational awareness and visual alertness by both flight crews, who failed to identify the conflicting traffic despite radio communications indicating both were at the same altitude in the same sector.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Aeroflot 7957 — Antonov An-24RV · CCCP-46518
Aeroflot S-31 — Yakovlev Yak-40 · CCCP-87772
Systems & Failure Modes
Air Traffic Control Separation
The procedural system used by controllers to ensure aircraft maintain minimum vertical and horizontal distances.
Visual Alertness
The 'see and avoid' principle which failed as both crews did not spot the other aircraft in clear conditions.
Interesting Facts
- 01The wreckage was located at a depth of 500 to 600 meters in the Black Sea.
- 02The air traffic controller had been working for more than six hours at the time of the collision.
- 03The tail sections of both aircraft were severed upon impact.
- 04The tail section of the Yak-40 was located, but its fuselage and the bodies of those on board were never recovered.
Safety Actions & Advisories
ATC Workload Management
The accident highlighted the dangers of controller fatigue and the need for strict adherence to shift limits and handover procedures in busy sectors.
Visual Alertness Reinforcement
The investigation emphasized the 'see and avoid' principle, reminding flight crews that they maintain a responsibility for visual separation even when under positive radar or procedural control.