Investigation Summary
The aircraft was originally scheduled for a charter flight to Palma de Mallorca, but the takeoff was aborted after the number 4 engine suffered compressor damage. The airline decided to ferry the aircraft to Zurich for repairs using only three engines. During the flight planning process, the crew failed to officially notify Air Traffic Services (ATS) or the weather briefing office that the flight was a three-engine ferry, though the tower controller eventually learned of the status through other means. During the subsequent ferry takeoff on Runway 19, the pilot-in-command had to vary the power on the number 1 engine to maintain directional control as the nose yawed to the right. After rotating at 134 knots, the aircraft entered low clouds, causing an immediate loss of external visual references. The pilot struggled to maintain the climb while applying heavy rudder to compensate for the asymmetric thrust. A temperature inversion (a 10°C rise within the first 170 feet) and wind shear caused a sudden drop in airspeed and thrust. The aircraft banked 4-6 degrees to the right and stalled, striking trees and disintegrating in a forest. Survivors faced temperatures of -27°C; the first officer remained trapped in the wreckage for over eight hours before being rescued.
Final Conclusions
The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority concluded the accident was caused by the aircraft entering an uncontrollable attitude with increased drag and decreased airspeed. Contributing factors included the unexpected early loss of visual references after lift-off, loss of directional control during the transition to instrument flying, and the presence of a temperature inversion and wind shear which further reduced thrust and airspeed. The investigation also highlighted significant deficiencies in the airport's disaster preparedness and search and rescue capabilities.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Had performed several previous 3-engine ferry flights. Had flown 44 hours in the last 30 days.
First Officer
Had flown 33 hours in the last 30 days.
Flight Engineer
Had flown 42 hours in the last 30 days.
Systems & Failure Modes
General Electric CJ805-23 Engines
The aircraft was powered by four aft-fan turbojets; the number 4 engine was shut down for the ferry flight, creating significant asymmetric thrust.
Attitude Indicator / Vertical Gyro
Post-crash inspection found a loose locking nut in the pilot's vertical gyro, though investigators determined this likely occurred during impact rather than before.
Interesting Facts
- 01The temperature at the time of the accident was -27°C, contributing to the deaths of five occupants from exposure and injuries.
- 02All five fatalities were crew members (cabin staff and a ground engineer); the three flight crew members in the cockpit survived.
- 03The aircraft was performing a three-engine ferry flight due to compressor damage on the number 4 engine.
- 04The crew did not officially declare the three-engine status during the initial flight planning or weather briefing process.
- 05A temperature inversion of 10°C was present between the ground and 170 feet, which reduced engine thrust.
- 06The first officer was trapped in the cockpit for over eight hours before rescue teams could free him.
- 07The rescue response was hampered by a lack of radio equipment in ambulances and inadequate winter gear for medical staff.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Search and Rescue Reorganization
The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority identified deficiencies in emergency response, leading to a reorganization of search and rescue systems.
Disaster Medical Preparedness
The accident prompted the Swedish healthcare system to develop specialized disaster medical plans and improve emergency equipment for extreme environments.