Investigation Summary
The flight was a routine offshore passenger transfer between gas platforms in Morecambe Bay. During the approach to the North Morecambe platform, the co-pilot struggled to assess the correct approach angle due to the lack of a visible horizon and textural cues on the sea surface. Flight data indicated the helicopter began to oscillate in pitch and roll as it neared the deck. The co-pilot expressed his discomfort, stating, "NO I’M NOT HAPPY MATE," and requested help. However, the handover of control was not immediate or precise, occurring approximately four seconds after the initial request. Although the commander initially leveled the wings, he was likely distracted by the co-pilot's condition and disoriented by the helicopter's rapid movements. In the absence of external visual references, the commander failed to monitor the flight instruments effectively, allowing the helicopter to bank right and descend until it struck the sea at high speed.
Final Conclusions
The AAIB investigation (Report No: 7/2008) concluded the accident was caused by human factors. The co-pilot lost control during a night approach in poor weather with limited visual cues. Contributory factors included an imprecise transfer of control between the pilots, the commander's lack of mental priming to take control, and the commander's subsequent distraction from his instrument scan. The investigation also noted that while a synthetic training device (simulator) was available for the SA365N, it was not utilized by the operator, missing an opportunity for the crew to practice recovery from such scenarios in a controlled environment.
Video Analysis
The 2006 Morecambe Bay Helicopter Crash — A detailed look at the human factors and spatial disorientation that led to the G-BLUN accident in the Irish Sea.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Commander
Aged 51. Held a valid Airline Transport Pilot's Licence (Helicopters).
Co-pilot
Aged 43. Handling pilot during the approach. Held a valid Commercial Pilot's Licence (Helicopters).
Systems & Failure Modes
CVFDR
Combined Voice and Flight Data Recorder; the magnetic tape was damaged by seawater corrosion, leading to some data loss where the tape contacted the metal heads.
AVAD
Automatic Voice Alert Device; a system designed to provide verbal altitude warnings to the crew during descent.
IHUMS
Integrated Health & Usage Monitoring System; used to record flight data and monitor the vibration of rotating components.
Interesting Facts
- 01The night was exceptionally dark with overcast clouds obscuring all celestial illumination.
- 02The helicopter was fully serviceable with no evidence of pre-impact mechanical failure.
- 03The Automatic Voice Alert Device (AVAD) triggered a warning at 100 feet, but it went unheeded by both crew members.
- 04The impact occurred within sight of the destination gas platform.
- 05The co-pilot had not articulated his need for help clearly during the initial moments of disorientation.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Training Device Utilization
The investigation recommended that operators make full use of available synthetic training devices for the SA365N to improve crew competency in unusual attitude recovery and CRM.
Offshore Meteorological Standards
The AAIB highlighted that offshore personnel providing weather data were not formally qualified, leading to recommendations for standardized training for offshore weather observers.