Investigation Summary
The accident exposed a 'black hole' business model where Manx2 acted as a virtual airline, selling tickets for flights operated by Flightline S.L. using aircraft and crews provided by Air Lada. This diffusion of responsibility meant that no single entity was effectively monitoring safety standards or crew training. The crew on Flight 7100 was exceptionally inexperienced for the conditions: the captain had been in command for only four days, and the first officer had not yet completed his required line checks. On the day of the accident, the crew performed two unsuccessful approaches in visibility well below legal minima, violating the 'approach ban' rule. During the third and final approach, the division of labor was non-standard: the captain operated the power levers while the first officer focused on flight instruments. As they descended below the 200-foot decision height without visual contact, the captain pulled the power levers back into the ground-idle (Beta) range to slow the aircraft. This caused the engines to behave unpredictably, creating a significant thrust imbalance. When the order for a go-around was given at approximately 100 feet, the sudden application of power to the mismatched engines caused the aircraft to roll 97 degrees to the right, striking the wingtip and flipping onto its roof.
Final Conclusions
The AAIU Final Report (2014-001) concluded the probable cause was a loss of control during an attempted go-around initiated below Decision Height in IMC. Significant factors included the continuation of the approach below required visibility, uncoordinated operation of flight and engine controls, and the prohibited retardation of power levers below the in-flight range. The report also highlighted systemic failures: inadequate command training, inappropriate crew pairing, and insufficient oversight of the remote operation by both the operator and the Spanish aviation authorities.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Manx2 Flight 7100 Aftermath Footage | 10 February 2011 Cork — News footage showing the inverted wreckage of the Fairchild Metro III at Cork Airport following the fatal crash of Flight 7100.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Only 25 hours as Pilot-in-Command.
First Officer
Had not completed required line checks.
Systems & Failure Modes
Power Levers (Beta Range)
The TPE331 engines have a 'Beta' range for ground operations. Retarding levers into this range in flight causes the propellers to act as massive airbrakes, leading to unpredictable thrust and potential loss of control.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
The crew used the ILS for all three approaches, but lacked the CAT II certification required to land in the prevailing low-visibility conditions at Cork.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was manufactured in 1992 and had 32,653 airframe hours at the time of the accident.
- 02The captain had only 25 hours of experience as a pilot-in-command on the Fairchild Metro III.
- 03The first officer had not completed his required line check with Air Lada before being assigned to the flight.
- 04The crew violated the 'approach ban' by continuing three separate approaches when visibility was below legal minima.
- 05The commander retarded the power levers into the 'Beta' range, which is strictly prohibited during flight.
- 06The accident led to the liquidation of Manx2 in 2012; its successor, Citywing, eventually ceased operations in 2017.
- 07In April 2011, former Manx2 pilot Oliver Lee, who had recently left the airline, committed suicide, reportedly due to a sense of guilt following the accident.
Safety Actions & Advisories
EASA AOC Restrictions
Following the accident, EASA initiated procedures to suspend Flightline's AOC and eventually banned the operator from using Fairchild Metro III aircraft.
Operational Oversight Reform
The investigation prompted calls for better regulation of 'virtual airlines' and ticket sellers to ensure operational control and safety oversight are clearly defined.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Virtual Airline Accountability
Reference ↗The accident sparked significant controversy regarding the 'virtual airline' business model, where Manx2 sold tickets but had no operational control over the aircraft or crew. This led to a 'black hole' of accountability between the ticket seller (Manx2), the AOC holder (Flightline S.L.), and the crew provider (Air Lada).
Legal Action Against Multiple Entities
Reference ↗Following the final report, families of the victims and survivors initiated legal proceedings against Manx2, Flightline, and Air Lada, highlighting the difficulty in seeking justice when operational responsibilities are fragmented across different jurisdictions.