Investigation Summary
The accident was characterized by a breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM) and procedural discipline. During taxi, the crew missed the intended intersection D6 and lined up at D5. When ATC pointed out the error and noted the significantly reduced Take-Off Run Available (TORA), the crew performed a hurried recalculation on a tablet. The investigation found that the crew entered incorrect data into their calculation application, including the wrong takeoff direction, and failed to update the Flight Management System (FMS) with the necessary performance parameters for a short-field departure. Specifically, they left the thrust setting at 'FLEX 33' instead of 'TO-1 NO FLEX' and maintained 'FLAPS 1' instead of the required 'FLAPS 4'. During the takeoff roll, the crew realized the runway was insufficient but decided to continue, delaying rotation to maximize speed. The aircraft struck the ILS localizer monitor antenna, which became embedded in the left wing root, and multiple approach lights, causing severe structural damage and a major fuel leak.
Final Conclusions
The final report issued by the Serbian Center for Investigation of Accidents in Transport (CINS) in December 2025 concluded that the accident was the result of a sequence of human errors, significant breakdowns in Crew Resource Management (CRM), and a systemic non-adherence to established procedures. The investigation determined that the crew's decision to attempt a takeoff from intersection D5 with insufficient runway length was the proximate cause. Contributing factors included the entry of incorrect performance data into the calculation application, a failure to update the Flight Management System (FMS) for the actual departure conditions, and the captain's pressure on the first officer to proceed despite the error. The report also criticized the airport's emergency response for initially parking the fuel-leaking aircraft at a terminal gate, though it noted that safety recommendations regarding these procedures were subsequently fulfilled.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Systems & Failure Modes
Flight Management System (FMS)
The crew failed to update the FMS with 'TO-1 NO FLEX' thrust and 'FLAPS 4' settings required for the shorter runway.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
The aircraft struck the ILS monitor antenna for the reciprocal runway, causing the airport's ILS capability to be downgraded from CAT III to CAT I.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a 16-year-old Embraer E195LR operated by Marathon Airlines under a wet-lease agreement.
- 02The takeoff was attempted with 1,273 meters of runway instead of the planned 2,349 meters.
- 03The left wing root struck the ILS monitor antenna, which remained embedded in the fuselage during flight.
- 04The aircraft was written off due to substantial structural damage and punctures to the fuselage.
- 05Air Serbia terminated its contract with Marathon Airlines two days after the accident.
- 06In 2025, Air Serbia reached an out-of-court settlement with approximately 50 passengers, paying roughly 1,000,000 RSD (approx. €8,500) per person.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Emergency Response Revision
Belgrade Airport revised emergency plans to ensure aircraft leaking fuel are directed to remote stands rather than terminal gates.
Contract Termination
Air Serbia ceased all cooperation with Marathon Airlines to ensure passenger safety standards.
Location
APPROXIMATE POSITION · AIRPORT LEVEL · Coordinates are the estimate published in the entered by an editor. The ring shows the accuracy the record supports, not the point of impact.