Investigation Summary
Flight 470 was a routine scheduled service cruising at 38,000 feet when the first officer left the cockpit. Shortly after, the captain locked the cockpit door and manually adjusted the autopilot altitude settings in three distinct steps: first to 4,288 feet, then to 1,888 feet, and finally to 592 feet, which was below the local ground elevation. The captain also manually adjusted the aircraft's speed and deployed the spoilers to increase the rate of descent. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data captured the sound of the co-pilot repeatedly banging on the locked door and several cockpit alarms, including the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), as the aircraft descended at approximately 100 feet per second. The investigation into the captain's background revealed significant personal stressors, including the death of his son exactly one year prior to the accident, unresolved divorce proceedings, and his daughter's recent heart surgery. Despite airline policy requiring two crew members in the cockpit at all times, no cabin crew member entered the flight deck when the co-pilot departed.
Final Conclusions
The Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigations Namibia (DAAI) released its final report on 15 April 2016. The report concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the intentional inputs to the autopilot flight systems by the captain, which caused the aircraft to depart from cruise flight and transition into a sustained controlled descent until impact. The captain was alone in the cockpit at the time of the event, having locked the door to prevent the co-pilot from re-entering.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
When a Pilot Locks the Door: The Final Minutes of LAM 470 — An analysis of the deliberate crash of LAM Mozambique Flight 470, exploring the investigation into the captain's actions and the tragic parallels to later aviation incidents.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Identified as Herminio dos Santos Fernandes.
First Officer
Identified as Grácio Gregório Chimuquile.
Systems & Failure Modes
Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS)
The captain used the AFDS to manually override the cruise altitude and speed, commanding a rapid descent that the system maintained until impact.
Cockpit Door Locking System
The security door was manually locked from the inside by the captain, preventing the co-pilot from using his access code to re-enter the flight deck.
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
The GPWS issued audible alerts in the final moments of the flight as the aircraft rapidly approached the terrain, which were recorded by the CVR.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was only one year old and had been inspected the day before the crash.
- 02The captain had logged over 9,000 total flight hours, including 2,519 on the Embraer E190.
- 03The co-pilot was locked out of the cockpit and was recorded banging on the door during the descent.
- 04Autopilot settings were changed in three steps to an altitude below ground level.
- 05The crash occurred on the first anniversary of the death of the captain's son.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Two-Person Cockpit Rule
The investigation highlighted the failure to follow existing policies requiring a cabin crew member to enter the cockpit if one pilot leaves, leading to renewed emphasis on the 'rule of two' globally.
ELT Effectiveness Review
The final report identified the failure of the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) to activate as a significant weakness, citing research that ELTs often fail to trigger in high-energy impacts and questioning their overall effectiveness.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
AMOPAR Dispute of Findings
Reference ↗The Mozambican Association of Air Operators (AMOPAR) disputed the preliminary suicide finding, arguing that the captain's maneuvers could have been attempts to follow emergency procedures and that the investigation did not follow ICAO standards.