Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during 'HAVE ACE', a joint training exercise between the Louisiana Army National Guard (LAANG) and the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The mission involved 'Helo Cast' water insertion training. Although the previous night's training was successful, weather conditions on March 10 deteriorated rapidly. Mission briefs had established a minimum weather ceiling of 1,000 feet and three miles of visibility. The fog was so dense at the time of the exercise that the first helicopter in the flight aborted the mission and returned to base. However, the lead pilot of MOJO 69, who had a reputation for being 'aggressive', elected to proceed despite being informed of ceilings dropping below 200 feet. Approximately 2 minutes and 5 seconds after crossing from land to water, the crew encountered a 'total blackout' fog bank. Cockpit voice recordings indicated immediate confusion; the pilot believed he was turning east while the aircraft was actually turning north. The helicopter began erratic maneuvers, including rapid altitude changes and rearward flight. The crew attempted to engage the autopilot 17 seconds before impact, but the system could not couple because the aircraft was already outside the required flight parameters for engagement. The helicopter struck the water at high speed just three seconds after the co-pilot's final command to climb.
Final Conclusions
The joint investigation by SOCOM and the Louisiana Army National Guard concluded the primary cause was spatial disorientation resulting from the pilots' failure to transition from visual flight rules (VFR) to instrument flight rules (IFR) when they encountered IMC conditions. The report also cited a violation of a direct order, as the crew proceeded with the mission despite weather conditions being significantly below the mandatory minimums specified in the mission brief. The lead pilot's 'aggressive' reputation was noted as a factor in the decision to fly in unsafe conditions.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Crew Experience
Pilot (CW4 George Wayne Griffin Jr.)
Battalion standardization pilot with over 1,000 combat hours and 1,100 NVG hours.
Co-Pilot (CW4 George David Strother)
Instructor pilot with over 700 combat hours.
Crew Chief (Staff Sgt. Lance Bergeron)
One of the most qualified crew chiefs in the Guard, with 377 combat hours.
Systems & Failure Modes
Autopilot / Flight Control System
The crew attempted to engage the autopilot to stabilize the aircraft during disorientation, but the system did not activate because the helicopter's pitch, roll, or rate of movement exceeded the safety limits required for the system to take control.
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
The crew was using NVGs, but the dense fog created a 'white out' or 'black out' effect, rendering the goggles ineffective for maintaining visual orientation over the water.
Interesting Facts
- 01The crash was the deadliest day for MARSOC since its inception in 2006.
- 02The aircraft was a modern UH-60M model, tail number 13-20624.
- 03The investigation found no evidence of mechanical or systemic failure prior to impact.
- 04According to the FAA, spatial disorientation is a factor in 5 to 10 percent of all general aviation accidents, 90 percent of which are fatal.
- 05The crew attempted to engage the autopilot 17 seconds before impact, but the system could not couple due to the aircraft's extreme attitude.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Training Procedure Revision
Investigators recommended new training procedures and safeguards to improve pilot recognition of spatial disorientation and reinforce adherence to weather minimums.
Mission Risk Assessment
The report emphasized the need for stricter oversight during joint training exercises to ensure 'aggressive' pilot tendencies do not override safety protocols.