Investigation Summary
The flight arrived at Toronto during a period of intense weather characterized by heavy rain, shifting winds, and lightning. The crew opted to land on Runway 24L, which at 2,744 meters (9,003 ft) was the shortest available runway at the airport, though typically sufficient for an A340. During the final approach, the aircraft encountered changing wind conditions and heavy precipitation, which led to the aircraft being above the glide path and traveling faster than the target approach speed. The A340 touched down approximately 3,800 feet beyond the runway threshold, leaving only 5,100 feet of pavement remaining. The flight crew did not immediately select full reverse thrust, waiting several seconds after touchdown to do so. Combined with the water-covered runway surface and a sudden 10-knot tailwind, the aircraft could not be stopped before the end of the paved surface. It exited the runway at approximately 80 knots, crossed a service road, and plunged into the Etobicoke Creek ravine. The impact caused the aircraft to break into sections and ignited a fire that eventually destroyed the fuselage.
Final Conclusions
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) concluded that the primary cause was the crew's decision to continue the landing despite the deteriorating weather and the aircraft's unstable approach profile. Contributing factors included the lack of a requirement for landing distance calculations that account for runway contamination during thunderstorms and the delay in deploying thrust reversers, exacerbated by the PNF's failure to make standard callouts for spoiler deployment. The TSB also noted that the crew did not use the rain repellent system despite severely reduced visibility. The successful evacuation of all occupants was attributed to the effective performance of the cabin crew and the passengers' rapid response, despite the loss of several emergency exits due to the fire and terrain.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
How Passengers of Air France 358 Battled for Their Lives — In August 2005, Air France Flight 358 crash-landed in a Toronto thunderstorm. The left engine caught fire, and over 300 passengers and crew successfully evacuated.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Alain Rosaye. Identified as the pilot not flying (PNF) during the landing phase, though he made the decision to continue the landing.
First Officer
Frederic Naud. Pilot flying (PF) during the landing.
Chief Purser
Stationed at L1.
Forward Purser
Stationed at L2.
Purser
Stationed at L4.
Cabin Crew
Stationed at L3.
Cabin Crew
Stationed at R3.
Cabin Crew
Stationed at R4.
Supplemental Cabin Crew
Stationed at R1.
Supplemental Cabin Crew
Stationed at R2.
Supplemental Cabin Crew
Stationed at Seat 10.
Additional Cabin Crew
Stationed at Seat 9; not yet qualified, on board for service purposes.
Systems & Failure Modes
Thrust Reversers
Mechanical systems that redirect engine exhaust forward to assist in braking. A delay in their deployment significantly increased the landing distance.
Ground Spoilers
Aerodynamic surfaces on the wings that deploy upon touchdown to dump lift. While they deployed automatically, the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) failed to make the standard 'Ground Spoilers' callout, which contributed to the crew's delayed awareness and subsequent delay in thrust reverser application.
Emergency Lighting
Internal lighting systems designed to guide passengers to exits. Some systems failed due to the impact, but the cabin crew used flashlights to manage the evacuation.
Rain Repellent System
A system designed to improve forward visibility in heavy rain. The crew did not use this system despite severely reduced visibility during the final approach.
Interesting Facts
- 01All 309 people on board survived the crash and subsequent fire.
- 02The aircraft was an Airbus A340-300 that had entered service in 1999.
- 03The runway was contaminated by standing water due to a severe thunderstorm occurring at the time of landing.
- 04The aircraft overran the runway and came to rest in a ravine.
- 05The evacuation was completed successfully despite only four of the eight emergency exits being usable.
- 06The crew did not utilize the aircraft's rain repellent system despite encountering intense precipitation and severely reduced visibility.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Runway End Safety Areas (RESA)
The TSB recommended that all major Canadian runways be equipped with a 300-meter Runway End Safety Area or a means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent level of safety.
Landing Distance Calculations
Recommendations were made to require pilots to perform actual landing distance calculations based on current runway conditions rather than relying on pre-flight estimates.