Investigation Summary
Flight 1420 was significantly delayed due to severe weather, putting the crew close to their 14-hour duty time limit. The crew had begun their duty day at Chicago O'Hare (ORD) at 10:30 CDT, meaning the accident occurred nearly 13.5 hours into their shift. In their haste to land before the storm reached the airport, the crew rushed the approach, leading to a breakdown in Cockpit Resource Management (CRM). During the transition from a visual approach to an ILS approach for Runway 4R, the crew failed to complete the landing checklist. Crucially, they did not arm the automatic spoiler system or the autobrakes. While the crew initially forgot to set the landing flaps, the first officer noticed the omission as the aircraft descended past 1,000 feet and successfully deployed them to the 40-degree setting. Upon touchdown, the spoilers did not deploy, which significantly reduced the aircraft's braking effectiveness on the water-contaminated runway. The captain also applied excessive reverse thrust (greater than 1.3 EPR), which caused the aircraft to lose directional control and slide off the end of the runway.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB issued its final report (NTSB/AAR-01/02) on October 23, 2001. The probable causes were the crew's failure to discontinue the approach during severe thunderstorms and their failure to ensure spoiler extension. Contributing factors included impaired performance due to fatigue and situational stress, and the use of excessive reverse thrust after landing. The investigation also highlighted the crew's confusion regarding crosswind limitations: the captain initially cited a 30-knot limit (the dry runway limit) before stating 20 knots, while the first officer incorrectly believed the wet runway limit was 25 knots. The actual limit for a wet runway was 20 knots.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
American Airlines 1420 Thunderstorm Crash 1999 | Mayday — An investigation into the crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 in Little Rock, Arkansas, exploring how fatigue and weather led to a fatal runway overrun.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Richard Buschmann
First Officer
Michael Origel
Systems & Failure Modes
Ground Spoilers
Aerodynamic surfaces on the wing that deploy upon touchdown to dump lift and increase wheel braking effectiveness. The crew failed to arm the auto-spoiler system during the rushed approach.
Autobrakes
A system that automatically applies wheel brakes upon landing. This system was also not armed by the crew during the pre-landing phase.
Thrust Reversers
Engine components that redirect exhaust forward to slow the aircraft. Excessive use (above 1.3 EPR) on the wet runway led to a loss of directional control.
Interesting Facts
- 01The captain had 10,234 total flight hours, with 5,518 on the MD-80 series.
- 02The first officer had 4,292 total flight hours but only 182 hours on the MD-80.
- 03The aircraft struck non-frangible approach-light supports, which contributed to the severity of the impact.
- 04The crew was under significant time pressure; the first officer had notified dispatch that they could not legally depart after 23:16 CDT due to the 14-hour duty limit.
- 05The MD-82's crosswind limit for a wet runway was 20 knots; the reported crosswind at landing was 25-28 knots.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Checklist Procedures
The NTSB recommended changes to landing checklists to ensure pilots explicitly verify spoiler and autobrake arming.
Airport Frangibility
The investigation highlighted the danger of non-frangible structures in runway safety areas, leading to stricter standards for airport light supports.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Buschmann Family Wrongful Death Verdict
Reference ↗A federal jury awarded the Captain's family $2 million, finding the airport liable for maintaining illegal non-frangible light supports in the safety area. The jury rejected the argument that the Captain was at fault, contradicting the NTSB's findings.