Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during the second leg of a multi-stop domestic route. After departing Namsos, the crew prepared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 04 at Brønnøysund. Despite the requirement to maintain 1,500 feet until 4 NM from the airport, the crew initiated their final descent at 8 NM. This premature descent placed the aircraft on a collision course with Torghatten, a 258-meter (846-foot) mountain. The aircraft struck the hillside at an altitude of 560 feet, well below the peak. A critical factor was the presence of a non-airline passenger in the cockpit jump seat. CVR analysis suggested the captain was engaged in non-essential conversation with this passenger during the approach, which likely disrupted the crew's situational awareness and mutual monitoring. Furthermore, the airline's maps contained several errors, and the crew used non-standard terminology (referring to 'Torghatten' in briefings despite it not being a designated navigational landmark).
Final Conclusions
The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) concluded that the primary cause was the premature commencement of the final approach descent by 4 nautical miles. While no single technical reason was found for this error, the board cited a breakdown in cockpit discipline and coordination. Contributing factors included the distraction caused by a jump-seat passenger, the lack of standardized callouts, and the airline's failure to implement adequate internal controls and training for the Dash 7. A supplementary investigation in 2013 confirmed the presence of two NMT-450 mobile telephones in the cockpit but concluded they did not cause electromagnetic interference that could have affected the flight.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Age 58. Employed by Widerøe since 1960.
First Officer
Age 31. Checked out on Dash 7 in February 1988.
Systems & Failure Modes
VOR/DME
The primary navigation system used for the non-precision approach; it was tested after the crash and found to be functioning correctly.
NMT-450 Mobile Phone
Early mobile phones with 15-watt transmitters; investigated in 2013 for potential electromagnetic interference with cockpit instruments.
SCAT-I
A satellite-based landing system later installed at Brønnøysund Airport to prevent similar CFIT accidents.
Interesting Facts
- 01The accident remains the deadliest involving a de Havilland Canada Dash 7.
- 02A non-airline passenger was permitted to sit in the cockpit jump seat despite the flight being fully booked and other Widerøe employees being on board.
- 03The investigation found five specific errors on Widerøe's navigational maps for the Brønnøysund area.
- 04The captain had recently returned from a six-week vacation and the first officer had only 85 hours of experience on the Dash 7.
- 05The 2013 supplementary investigation confirmed that two NMT-450 mobile phones (a Mobira MD 50 NA and a Mobira CU 59 D) were recovered from the crash site.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Sterile Cockpit Rule
The commission recommended that Widerøe introduce the Sterile Cockpit Rule to prohibit non-essential conversation during critical phases of flight.
Approach Procedure Modification
The Civil Aviation Administration was advised to increase the minimum altitudes for flight paths around Torghatten to ensure better terrain clearance.
Map and Checklist Updates
Widerøe was ordered to correct errors on its navigational maps and remove requirements for pilots to tune company radio frequencies during descent.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Mobile Phone Interference
Reference ↗In 2013, the AIBN reopened the case to investigate if two NMT-450 mobile phones on board could have caused electromagnetic interference. The supplementary report concluded no such interference occurred.