Investigation Summary
The flight was the final leg of a multi-stop route from Khabarovsk to Tynda via Blagoveshchensk. Due to poor weather at Tynda, the departure from Blagoveshchensk was delayed by nearly two hours. The flight was also being used for a training objective to upgrade the First Officer to Captain, with the First Officer acting as the Pilot Flying. As the aircraft approached Tynda, the crew faced a transition in Russian aviation procedures: Tynda had recently switched to using QNH (altimeter setting for sea level) and feet, whereas the crew was more accustomed to the traditional Soviet QFE (pressure at airfield level) and meters system. On the flight deck, the instrumentation was inconsistent: the First Officer had a modern AD32 altimeter capable of displaying feet, while the Captain's VD-10K altimeter displayed only meters. During the descent, the crew set the correct QNH pressure provided by the controller but continued to fly the altitudes prescribed for a QFE approach. This discrepancy meant that when the crew believed they were at a safe height above the airfield, they were actually 600 meters lower relative to the terrain. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that Tynda's secondary surveillance radar was inoperative, preventing the air traffic controller from seeing the aircraft's actual altitude and providing a correction. Finally, the crew had pressed the 'AUDIO INHIBIT' button on the TTA-12 GPWS system, silencing the aural warnings that would have alerted them to the impending collision with the ground.
Final Conclusions
The Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) released its final report on 9 February 2026. The investigation concluded the crash was a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) caused by the crew's failure to maintain the assigned altitude due to a discrepancy between the QNH pressure set on the altimeters and the QFE-based altitude values used for the approach. Contributing factors included the crew's lack of preparedness for QNH operations, the deactivation of GPWS audio alerts, the inoperative secondary radar at Tynda Airport, and the transmission of QNH values by the controller in millimeters of mercury without a specific request from the crew.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
61 years old, Vyacheslav Logvinov. Graduate of Talgat Bigeldinov Military Institute.
First Officer
37 years old, Kirill Plaksin. Pilot Flying during the accident leg as part of training.
Flight Engineer
30 years old, Vladimir Vokhmintsev. Licensed in August 2024.
Systems & Failure Modes
TTA-12 GPWS
The Ground Proximity Warning System designed to alert the crew of terrain closure; the audio component was manually disabled via the 'AUDIO INHIBIT' button.
Barometric Altimeters
The aircraft used a mix of VD-10K (meters only) and AD32 (feet/meters) altimeters, contributing to confusion during the transition to QNH/feet operations.
Secondary Surveillance Radar
Ground-based equipment at Tynda that was inoperative at the time of the crash, which would have otherwise allowed ATC to detect the altitude error.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was 49 years old at the time of the accident, having been manufactured in 1976.
- 02The crew set QNH pressure (751 mmHg) but flew altitudes intended for QFE, resulting in a 600-meter altitude deficit.
- 03The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) audio was manually inhibited by the crew, violating the Operations Manual.
- 04Tynda Airport's secondary surveillance radar had been inoperative since March 2025, leaving controllers unable to monitor aircraft altitude.
- 05The First Officer was the Pilot Flying as part of a captaincy upgrade training program.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Maintenance Certificate Revocation
Rosaviatsia revoked Angara Airlines' certificate to perform its own maintenance following inspections that revealed systematic documentation and equipment violations.
Operating License Revocation
On 27 October 2025, the Russian aviation regulator ordered the revocation of Angara Airlines' operating license effective November 2025.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Departure Delay and Weather Minima Dispute
Reference ↗There is a documented discrepancy in reports regarding the departure delay from Blagoveshchensk. While some sources state the flight was delayed by 1 hour and 35 minutes, others indicate a longer wait until weather reports showed improvement above the 200m ceiling minimum. Wikipedia notes this specific timing as 'dubious' and subject to dispute.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the entered by an editor.