Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during a night cargo flight in total darkness, leaving the crew entirely dependent on instruments. At 00:19:20, IRU 1 malfunctioned, causing the captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) to show a rapid increase in pitch. The autopilot disconnected, and the captain, acting on the false data, pushed the yoke forward and applied nose-down stabilizer trim. This maneuver induced negative G-forces, which likely impaired the crew's cognitive processing. As the aircraft entered a steep dive, the PFDs entered a 'declutter' mode due to the extreme attitude, which inadvertently removed the 'PITC' comparator warning that would have alerted the pilots to the mismatch between their displays. The first officer's instruments remained functional, but he failed to effectively communicate the correct attitude or take control. The aircraft exceeded its maximum operating speed within 17 seconds and eventually struck the ground at a vertical speed so high that the wreckage was confined to a small, high-energy impact crater.
Final Conclusions
The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) concluded the accident was caused by insufficient operational prerequisites for managing a failure in a redundant system. Contributing factors included the lack of effective communication during the emergency, a flight instrument system that provided inadequate guidance regarding the specific malfunction, and the initial negative G-load maneuver which compromised the pilots' ability to manage the situation rationally. The SHK published its final report, SRL 2016:01e, on 12 December 2016.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Nose-diving into the Ground (West Air Sweden Flight 294) — A detailed look at how a single instrument failure and subsequent spatial disorientation led to the high-speed crash of a CRJ-200 cargo jet in the Swedish Arctic.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Spanish national, 42 years old.
First Officer
French national, 33 years old.
Systems & Failure Modes
Inertial Reference Unit (IRU)
The aircraft had two IRUs providing attitude and navigation data. IRU 1 failed, sending false pitch-up data to the captain's display and the FDR.
Primary Flight Display (PFD) Declutter
A safety feature designed to simplify the display during unusual attitudes; however, it removed the 'miscompare' warnings that could have identified the instrument failure.
Autopilot
Disconnected automatically when the IRU 1 data became inconsistent, leaving the pilots to hand-fly the aircraft in total darkness.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft impacted the ground in an inverted, nose-down position; the last valid FDR speed was 508 knots (941 km/h).
- 02The impact created a crater approximately 50 meters in diameter and 6 meters deep.
- 03The PFD declutter function removed the pitch comparator warning during the upset, depriving the crew of a critical failure alert.
- 04The IRU failure rate for this model was extremely low, estimated at 5.7 per million flight hours.
- 05The investigation found that the crew's simulator training did not replicate the PFD declutter behavior seen during the actual accident.
- 06The aircraft (MSN 7010) was originally manufactured in 1993 as a CRJ-100ER and was later converted to a CRJ-200PF freighter configuration.
Safety Actions & Advisories
PFD Software Update
Source ↗Recommendations were made to ensure that critical comparator warnings remain visible even when flight displays enter 'unusual attitude' declutter modes.
Training Improvements
Source ↗The SHK recommended that Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) include scenarios involving contradictory instrument indications and the effects of negative G-loads.
IRU Reliability Monitoring
Source ↗The SHK issued recommendations regarding the monitoring and reporting of intermittent faults in IRU components to ensure they are identified and corrected before total failure.
EASA Regulatory Review
Source ↗The SHK issued 14 safety recommendations in total, including requests for EASA to review the requirements for flight instrument systems to provide better guidance during redundant system failures.