Investigation Summary
The investigation into Flight 1260 revealed significant deficiencies in both crew performance and company oversight. The captain had a documented history of failing check rides, including a 2016 ATP check ride where he failed to initiate a go-around during an unstable approach with GPWS warnings. He had concealed these failures from Air Cargo Carriers during his application. Text messages recovered from the first officer's phone indicated a dysfunctional cockpit environment where the captain frequently slept during flights and demonstrated poor instrument flying skills. On the morning of the accident, the crew opted for a VOR-A circling approach to Runway 5 despite company SOPs requiring straight-in approaches when available. Weather conditions at the time included a broken ceiling at 500 feet, which was below the 773-foot MDA for the circling approach, a fact the approach controller failed to relay to the crew. During the final turn, the aircraft entered a 2,500 foot-per-minute descent in a steep left bank. The captain attempted to pull up just before impact, but the aircraft struck the runway in a nose-down, left-wing-low attitude, resulting in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
Final Conclusions
The NTSB determined the probable cause was the flight crew's improper decision to conduct a circling approach contrary to SOPs and the captain's excessive descent rate and maneuvering, leading to inadvertent, uncontrolled contact with the ground. Contributing factors included the operator's lack of a formal safety oversight program to monitor pilots with known performance issues and ensure SOP compliance.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Had a history of check ride failures and was reported to sleep during flights.
First Officer
Expressed concerns about the captain's IFR skills in private text messages.
Systems & Failure Modes
GPWS
The Ground Proximity Warning System; the captain had previously failed a check ride for ignoring GPWS 'sink rate' warnings.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
Company rules mandated stabilized approach criteria which were bypassed by the crew's decision to perform a circling maneuver.
Interesting Facts
- 01The captain had lied on his employment application, stating he had never failed a check ride.
- 02The first officer had only 652 total flight hours, with 333 hours on the Short 330.
- 03The aircraft was manufactured in 1979 and was operating on behalf of UPS.
- 04Weather at the time of the accident included an overcast ceiling at 500 feet, which was below the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) for the requested VOR-A approach.
- 05The approach controller failed to provide the crew with a special weather observation indicating the deteriorating ceiling.
- 06The NTSB classified the accident as controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) resulting from an unstable approach.
- 07The operator lacked a formal safety management system (SMS) to identify and mitigate pilot performance risks.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Safety Oversight Program
The NTSB recommended that the operator implement a formal safety and oversight program to assess hazards and monitor pilot compliance with SOPs.