Investigation Summary
The flight was a scheduled service from Rio de Janeiro to London with a stopover in Paris. The journey was uneventful until the aircraft began its descent into Orly Airport. At approximately 8,000 feet, a fire was detected in the aft right lavatory. The cabin crew attempted to fight the fire with extinguishers, but the smoke was so dense and the fire so well-hidden within the lavatory structure that their efforts were ineffective. Toxic smoke, containing high concentrations of carbon monoxide, moved forward rapidly. As the crew attempted an emergency descent, the smoke became so dense in the cockpit that they were forced to don oxygen masks and found it nearly impossible to see their instruments. Realizing they could not reach the runway due to total loss of visibility, Relief Captain Antonio Fuzimoto, who was at the controls, opted for a forced landing in a field. The aircraft touched down with gear down and full flaps, but the main gear collapsed and the engines were torn off during the slide. While the fuselage remained largely intact, the interior was a death trap of toxic fumes. Firefighters arriving minutes later found the roof burned through and most occupants already deceased from asphyxiation. Only 11 people survived: 10 crew members who escaped through the cockpit windows and forward galley, and one passenger, Ricardo Trajano, who survived by moving to the front of the cabin against instructions.
Final Conclusions
The Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) concluded that the fire started in the washbasin unit of the aft right toilet. The primary cause of death for the 123 fatalities was poisoning by carbon monoxide and other combustion products. The investigation highlighted that the cabin crew's fire-fighting efforts were ineffective because the fire was difficult to locate, and the flight crew lacked the means to prevent the smoke from invading the cockpit. The report noted that the decision to perform a forced landing was necessitated by the total loss of visibility in the cockpit.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
A Careless Passenger Killed Them (Varig Flight 820) - DISASTER BREAKDOWN — A detailed look at the 1973 Varig Flight 820 disaster, where a small lavatory fire led to a catastrophic loss of life and changed aviation smoking regulations forever.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Gilberto Araújo da Silva
First Officer
Alvio Basso
Flight Engineer
Claunor Bello
Navigator
Zilmar Gomes da Cunha
Relief Captain
Antonio Fuzimoto (Pilot at controls during landing)
Relief First Officer
Ronald Utermoehl
Relief Flight Engineer
Carlos Nato Diefenthaler
Relief Navigator
Salvador Ramos Heleno
Systems & Failure Modes
Lavatory Waste Receptacle
The unit where the fire is believed to have originated, likely due to a discarded cigarette. Post-accident regulations required these to be fire-resistant and equipped with self-closing doors.
Oxygen Masks
The flight crew donned oxygen masks to breathe, but the masks did not prevent the smoke from obscuring their vision of the flight instruments.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a Boeing 707-345C, the specific customer variant for Varig.
- 02Only one passenger, 21-year-old Ricardo Trajano, survived the accident.
- 03Captain Gilberto Araújo da Silva, who survived this crash, later disappeared while commanding Varig Flight 967 in 1979.
- 04The fire resulted in the FAA issuing AD 74-08-09, which mandated 'No Smoking' signs in lavatories and the installation of ashtrays and wastebin fire precautions.
- 05Most passengers died from carbon monoxide poisoning before the aircraft even touched the ground.
Safety Actions & Advisories
FAA AD 74-08-09
Mandated the installation of placards prohibiting smoking in lavatories, the installation of ashtrays outside lavatories, and regular inspections of waste receptacle doors to ensure they seal correctly to stifle potential fires.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the official investigation report.