Investigation Summary
The investigation by the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) revealed a systemic failure in ground handling and crew training. The aircraft, an ATR 72-201, had accumulated significant ice while parked in temperatures near 0°C with snow and rain. Although the crew observed ice falling off the wings when they activated the de-icing boots during taxi, they did not return for professional ground de-icing. The MAK found that the airline's training focused heavily on in-flight icing but neglected ground icing hazards. Furthermore, the pilots' English proficiency was insufficient to comprehend the aircraft's technical manuals, which were not available in Russian. This language barrier prevented them from fully understanding the critical performance penalties associated with ground icing. Engineering simulations later proved that the aircraft would have been recoverable if the crew had simply re-extended the flaps to 15 degrees and pitched the nose down, but the pilots instead pulled back on the control column until impact.
Final Conclusions
The MAK concluded the immediate cause was the PIC's decision to take off without de-icing treatment despite visible contamination, leading to a stall during flap retraction. Contributing factors included shortcomings in UTair's safety management system, inadequate ground handling oversight, and the crew's lack of training regarding ground icing and stall recovery. The investigation also highlighted the crew's fatigue, noting violations of work-rest balance and a high number of unused days-off. In 2015, a Russian court sentenced a maintenance manager and a mechanic to over five years in prison for their roles in releasing the aircraft without de-icing.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Unheeded Warnings | UTAir Flight 120 — A detailed look at the factors leading to the crash of UTair Flight 120, focusing on the crew's decision to skip de-icing and the subsequent aerodynamic stall.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Sergey Sergeevich Antsin, aged 27. Graduated from Ulyanovsk Civil Flying School in 2008.
First Officer
Nikita Vitalievich Chekhlov, aged 23. Graduated from Krasnokutsk Civil Flight School in 2008.
Systems & Failure Modes
De-icing Boots
Pneumatic surfaces on the leading edges of the wings designed to break off ice in flight; they are ineffective at removing accumulated ground ice from the upper wing surfaces.
Flaps
High-lift devices on the wing; their premature retraction at low speed while the wing was contaminated by ice caused the loss of lift and the subsequent stall.
Autopilot
The system was engaged shortly after takeoff but was unable to maintain control once the aircraft began to stall due to icing-induced aerodynamic degradation.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft had been parked outside for eight hours in freezing rain and snow without de-icing.
- 02The crew activated the on-board de-icing boots during taxi, which is not a substitute for ground de-icing.
- 03Ten passengers survived the initial impact and fire, many of whom were thrown into deep snow.
- 04The ATR 72 flight manual was only available in English, which the crew could not adequately read.
- 05A Russian court later held both the deceased Captain and two maintenance staff legally responsible for the crash.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Ground Handling Regulations
The MAK recommended the establishment of state requirements for ground handling, specifically regarding de-icing treatment, staff training, and organization licensing.
Language Proficiency Standards
Investigators reiterated the need for clear criteria to determine 'sufficient' English proficiency for pilots operating aircraft with English-only technical documentation.