Investigation Summary
The flight was the final leg of a route from Amman to Khartoum via Damascus. Due to severe weather at Khartoum, the crew initially diverted to Port Sudan for over an hour before returning when conditions were reported to have improved. During the final approach to runway 36, the tower provided wind data indicating a 7-knot headwind, but actual conditions at the time of touchdown involved a 15-knot tailwind. This discrepancy, combined with a long landing flare, resulted in the aircraft touching down 900 meters into the 2,980-meter runway at 20:26 local time (17:26 UTC). The aircraft was operating under a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) item with the left engine thrust reverser deactivated. When the captain applied reverse thrust, the asymmetrical power caused the jet to veer right. Although the captain corrected the heading and applied full manual braking, he had disabled the anti-skid system, causing the tires to lock on the slippery, rain-soaked surface. The aircraft exited the runway at 76 knots, striking approach light structures which severed fuel lines and ignited a massive fire on the starboard side.
Final Conclusions
The investigation concluded the primary cause was a long landing flare on a wet, slippery runway without the use of autobrakes and with one deactivated thrust reverser. Contributing factors included the provision of incorrect wind information by air traffic control, which left the crew unaware of a significant tailwind and their high ground speed. The evacuation was hampered by intense smoke, the failure of the rear left slide due to the aircraft's pitch, and a lack of effective communication among the crew and rescue services.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Untimely Information | Sudan Airways Flight 109 — An analysis of the 2008 runway overrun in Khartoum, focusing on the tailwind conditions and mechanical status of the Airbus A310.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
60 years old at time of accident.
First Officer
50 years old at time of accident.
Systems & Failure Modes
Thrust Reversers
The No. 1 (left) reverser was deactivated prior to the flight; the use of the No. 2 reverser alone created asymmetrical force that pulled the aircraft off the centerline.
Anti-Skid System
The pilot switched the anti-skid off during the overrun sequence, which caused the wheels to lock and reduced braking effectiveness on the wet runway.
Autobrake
The crew elected not to use the autobrake system despite reports of a wet and slippery runway.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was operating with the No. 1 engine thrust reverser deactivated and inhibited.
- 02Khartoum Tower reported a 7-knot headwind when the actual condition was a 15-knot tailwind.
- 03The aircraft touched down at a ground speed of 155 knots, significantly higher than the indicated airspeed of 140 knots.
- 04The captain manually disabled the anti-skid system during the braking sequence.
- 05Rescue operations were delayed by a lack of communication equipment and a shortage of fire-fighting personnel.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Regulatory Suspension
Two weeks after the accident, Sudan's Civil Aviation Authority suspended Sudan Airways flights for failing to comply with international safety standards identified in an annual audit.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Manufacturer Liability Lawsuit
Reference ↗In 2010, families of the victims filed a lawsuit against Airbus and several component manufacturers in the US, alleging the aircraft was defective and that systems like the GPWS provided false warnings.