Investigation Summary
The accident highlighted a specific design characteristic of the Airbus A310 autopilot system. Unlike many other aircraft of the era, the A310 allowed for the partial disengagement of the autopilot. If a pilot (or in this case, a child) applied a force of approximately 8-10 kg to the control wheel for several seconds, the autopilot would disconnect from the aileron (roll) linkage while remaining engaged for pitch and altitude. Crucially, this 'declutching' did not trigger an audible warning, only a silent indicator light that the crew missed. Because the autopilot was still trying to maintain altitude, it increased the pitch as the aircraft banked, leading to a high angle of attack and a subsequent stall. The investigation also noted that the co-pilot's seat was pushed fully aft, delaying his ability to reach the controls during the critical first seconds of the upset.
Final Conclusions
The Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) concluded the crash resulted from the captain allowing unauthorized individuals to occupy the pilot seats and manipulate controls. The primary technical factor was the undetected partial disengagement of the autopilot's roll channel. The crew's failure to recognize the bank angle and their subsequent inappropriate control inputs during the stall recovery, exacerbated by the captain being out of his seat and the co-pilot's seat position, led to the fatal impact.
Video Analysis
Pilot's CHILDREN in Control! | Aeroflot Flight 593 — On 23 March 1994, the aircraft operating the route crashed into the Kuznetsk Alatau killing all 63 passengers and 12 crew members on board after the pilot's son accidentally disengaged the autopilot.
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Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Relief Captain
Yaroslav Kudrinsky. Allowed his children to sit at the controls.
First Officer
Igor Piskaryov. Was in the right-hand seat during the upset.
Systems & Failure Modes
Autopilot (Roll Channel)
The system that controls the aircraft's bank. It partially disengaged when Eldar's physical input exceeded the torque limiter's threshold.
Aileron Control Linkage
The mechanical connection between the cockpit controls and the wing surfaces that was 'declutched' from the autopilot.
Flight Data Recorder (FDR)
Captured the control forces and autopilot status, revealing the sequence of the manual override.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a nearly new Airbus A310, manufactured in 1991, with only 5,375 airframe hours.
- 02The flight was carrying 75 people in total: 63 passengers and 12 crew members.
- 03The captain's son was 15 years old, and his daughter was 12.
- 04The A310 autopilot did not have an audible 'declutch' warning for partial disengagement at the time.
- 05The flight was carrying 30 airline employees and family members among the 63 passengers.
- 06The investigation found that if the pilots had simply let go of the controls, the aircraft's safety systems would have likely recovered the flight automatically.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Autopilot Logic Revision
Recommendations were made to ensure that any partial or full autopilot disengagement by manual force is accompanied by a clear audible warning.
Cockpit Access Regulations
Aviation authorities worldwide reinforced strict prohibitions against unauthorized persons, including family members, occupying pilot seats or manipulating controls.