Investigation Summary
During the descent into Jambi, the crew was operating with the number one engine-driven generator unserviceable, necessitating the use of the APU generator. While descending through 1,600 feet and approximately 13 seconds after selecting Flaps 15, the crew received a 'Hydraulic System A Low Pressure' warning and observed the quantity indicator drop to zero. This system is critical for the operation of the landing gear, inboard spoilers, ground spoilers, and the normal braking system (including anti-skid). Instead of executing a missed approach to consult the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), the Captain decided to continue the approach with Flaps 15, aiming to fly slightly below the glide path to maximize available runway. The aircraft touched down at a speed 27 knots higher than the reference speed (Vref). Because hydraulic system A was depleted, the speed brakes (spoilers) did not deploy, and the thrust reversers were difficult to engage. The crew applied manual braking, but without the anti-skid system and ground spoilers to dump lift and put weight on the wheels, the aircraft failed to decelerate effectively. The Boeing 737 drifted right and exited the runway at approximately 200 meters from the end, plunging into a field six meters below the runway elevation. The impact detached both engines and the landing gear.
Final Conclusions
The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) concluded that the primary cause was the crew's decision to continue the landing despite a significant hydraulic failure that occurred at 1,600 feet, which provided sufficient time for a missed approach. Contributing factors included the failure to follow QRH procedures, a touchdown speed significantly higher than Vref, and the absence of speed brake deployment, which prevented necessary deceleration. The NTSC also noted a failure in Crew Resource Management (CRM), as the pilots did not discuss the consequences of the hydraulic loss before landing. The final report (KNKT.08.08.12.04) was released in September 2015.
Video Analysis
Sriwijaya Air flight 62 incident — On 27 August 2008, the aircraft overran the runway and crashed onto a house during its landing attempt at Jambi. 26 people were injured.
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Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Mohammad Basuki, age 36
First Officer
Eri Radianto, age 34
Systems & Failure Modes
Hydraulic System A
Powers the landing gear, inboard spoilers, ground spoilers, and normal brakes. Its failure left the crew with only manual braking and no anti-skid or ground spoilers.
Thrust Reversers
The crew reported the thrust reverser levers were 'too heavy' to pull, a common symptom when hydraulic pressure is lost or restricted.
Speed Brakes / Spoilers
Ground spoilers failed to extend upon touchdown because they rely on Hydraulic System A, preventing the aircraft from dumping lift and increasing wheel braking effectiveness.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft struck three people on the ground; one farmer died the following day from his injuries.
- 02The aircraft was written off after both engines and all landing gear detached during the overrun.
- 03The NTSC determined the aircraft would have required 8,606 feet to stop given the hydraulic failure and weight, exceeding the 2,000-meter (6,561-foot) runway.
- 04The left aft cabin door was blocked by the detached left main landing gear, preventing its use during evacuation.
- 05The APU continued to run after the crash and had to be manually shut down by an engineer who entered the cockpit after the evacuation.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Airline Internal Safety Actions
Although the NTSC did not issue formal recommendations due to the 'irrelevant' severity classification of the crash, Sriwijaya Air implemented internal safety actions regarding hydraulic failure training and CRM.