Investigation Summary
The flight was significantly delayed by de-icing in Seattle and a 90-minute holding pattern near Bakersfield, causing the captain to consider a diversion to Las Vegas. Upon clearance for approach, the crew faced a complex situation: they were cleared for a back-course ILS approach to runway 07R, which SAS crews were not authorized to perform. Instead of requesting a different clearance, the captain elected to perform a VOR approach without informing air traffic control. During the descent, the crew lowered the landing gear, but the green 'safe' indicator for the nose gear failed to illuminate. The captain and flight engineer became fully occupied with troubleshooting the light, which involved recycling the gear and checking circuit breakers. During this period of intense distraction, the first officer, who was tasked with flying the aircraft, also diverted his attention to the gear issue. The aircraft descended at rates reaching 1,960 feet per minute. By the time the first officer noticed the altimeter nearing zero and attempted to pull up, it was too late to prevent impact. The fuselage broke into three pieces upon hitting the water. Two sections, including the tail and mid-fuselage, sank rapidly in approximately 350 feet of water, which contributed to the drowning of trapped occupants. The forward section, containing the cockpit and wings, remained buoyant for 20 hours, allowing the flight crew and several passengers to survive until rescue arrived.
Final Conclusions
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued its final report on July 1, 1970. The board determined the probable cause was a lack of crew coordination and inadequate monitoring of the aircraft's position in space during a critical phase of flight. The investigation highlighted that the landing gear indicator light design was not truly fail-safe; it used two bulbs, but if one failed, it was not detectable until the second also failed, leading to the false 'unsafe' indication. Additionally, the NTSB noted that the approach chart lacked a minimum crossing altitude at the Del Rey intersection, which deprived the crew of a vital altitude check that could have alerted them to their dangerously low position.
Video Analysis
Scandinavian Airlines Flight 933 News Report | 13 January 1969 Santa Monica Bay, California — Contemporary news footage and reports detailing the rescue efforts and the recovery of the DC-8 fuselage from Santa Monica Bay.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Systems & Failure Modes
Landing Gear Indicator Lights
A dual-bulb system designed for redundancy. The investigation found that a single bulb failure was not visible to the crew, meaning the 'fail-safe' design could result in a total dark-light scenario if the second bulb failed during flight.
Altimeter
The first officer incorrectly set his altimeter at the start of the descent. This created a discrepancy between his instrument and the captain's, which went unnoticed by the crew due to their preoccupation with the landing gear issue.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a Douglas DC-8-62 named 'Sverre Viking'.
- 02The crash occurred approximately 6 nautical miles (11 km) west of the airport.
- 03The fuselage broke into three pieces; the forward section remained afloat for 20 hours before sinking in shallow water during towing.
- 04The accident is frequently cited alongside Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 as a classic example of crew distraction leading to CFIT.
- 05The flight was nearly three hours behind schedule at the time of the accident.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Landing Gear Indicator Redesign
The NTSB advised the FAA to re-evaluate fail-safe designs for indicator lights to ensure that a single component failure is detectable by the crew.
Approach Chart Revisions
The investigation led to recommendations for including minimum crossing altitudes at all approach fixes on instrument charts to provide crews with altitude verification points.