Investigation Summary
The accident was characterized by a breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM) during a high-stress weather event. As the MD-82 approached Runway 27, it encountered a sudden increase in wind speed from 15 to 40 knots. The First Officer, who was the Pilot Flying, struggled to maintain the glide path. When the decision to go-around was made at approximately 40 feet, the throttles were initially advanced but then retarded to idle by the autothrottle system because the TO/GA (Take-Off/Go-Around) mode was not properly engaged or maintained. Neither pilot noticed the power reduction. The aircraft climbed briefly on momentum before stalling and diving into the ground. Post-crash investigations uncovered that both pilots were significantly over their legal flying hour limits, and the airline had systemic issues with falsified training records and inadequate oversight by the Thai Department of Civil Aviation.
Final Conclusions
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC) of Thailand concluded the primary causes were the flight crew's failure to follow standard operating procedures during a go-around. Specifically, they failed to ensure the engines were producing sufficient thrust and failed to monitor the aircraft's state. Contributing factors included severe wind shear, pilot fatigue due to excessive work hours, and a lack of effective CRM. The airline's internal training and safety programs were found to be critically deficient.
Video Analysis
The Crash of One-Two-GO Airlines Flight 269 at Phuket — This video examines the 2007 MD-82 crash in Thailand, detailing how pilot fatigue and improper go-around procedures in severe weather led to a fatal loss of control.
Watch on YouTube ↗If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Systems & Failure Modes
Autothrottle
The system retarded the throttles to idle during the go-around because the TO/GA mode was not properly active, a change the crew failed to monitor.
EGPWS
The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System provided 'Sink Rate' alerts as the aircraft's descent rate became excessive near the ground.
ILS
The Instrument Landing System guided the aircraft on a 1.4-degree offset approach required for terrain clearance at Phuket.
Interesting Facts
- 01The Captain had over 16,000 flight hours, while the First Officer had approximately 1,400.
- 02The aircraft was a 24-year-old McDonnell Douglas MD-82.
- 03Both pilots were found to have exceeded the legal limit of 100 flying hours per month.
- 04The investigation revealed that the airline had been falsifying pilot training and check-ride records.
- 0590 of the 130 people on board perished, including 5 crew members.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Airline Shutdown and Rebranding
Source ↗One-Two-GO Airlines had its Air Operator's Certificate suspended and eventually ceased operations, with its assets integrated back into Orient Thai Airlines.
Regulatory Oversight Reform
The Thai Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) faced intense scrutiny and was urged to implement stricter auditing of pilot flight hours and training records to prevent falsification.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Falsification of Training Records
Reference ↗Post-crash audits discovered that One-Two-GO and Orient Thai had systematically falsified pilot training and proficiency check records, leading to criminal investigations.