Investigation Summary
The flight, callsign HAZE 01, was part of a three-ship formation positioning to Kiruna to transport personnel during the Norwegian-led 'Cold Response 2012' exercise. A German Air Force Transall C-160, part of the same mission, had successfully landed at Kiruna just prior to HAZE 01's approach, which may have reinforced the crew's confidence in the ATC clearances provided. During the approach, the aircraft was operating in an area with limited radar coverage. Air traffic control (ATC) at Kiruna issued a clearance for the aircraft to descend to Flight Level 70, which placed the Hercules in uncontrolled airspace and below the safe altitude for the mountainous region. The investigation revealed that the crew did not challenge this clearance, likely due to a combination of factors including reliance on ATC and a lack of detailed terrain information. The maps provided to the crew by the Norwegian Air Force lacked accurate height data for the Swedish mountains. Furthermore, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) was configured in a 'Tactical' mode, which is designed to prevent nuisance alerts during low-level military maneuvers but, in this instance, prevented the system from providing a timely warning of the impending collision with the mountain wall.
Final Conclusions
The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (Statens haverikommission) released its final report (RM 2013:02) on 22 October 2013. It concluded the accident was caused by the crew not noticing shortcomings in the ATC clearances and the risks of following them, which led to the aircraft leaving controlled airspace at an altitude lower than the terrain. Contributing factors included organizational failures within the Norwegian Air Force regarding safe working methods for minimum flight levels and inadequate training for Swedish ATC personnel, who issued clearances contrary to regulations for IFR flight in uncontrolled airspace.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Tactical Disadvantage | The 2012 Crash of A Norwegian C-130J — An analysis of the Royal Norwegian Air Force C-130J crash into Mount Kebnekaise, exploring the human factors and organizational failures that led to the CFIT accident.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Ståle Garberg
First Officer
Truls Audun Ørpen
Systems & Failure Modes
GPWS/TAWS
The Ground Proximity Warning System was in 'Tactical' mode, which inhibited terrain alerts to allow for military low-level operations, resulting in no warning before impact.
Radar Coverage
The aircraft was operating outside of effective Swedish radar coverage at the time of the descent, limiting the controller's ability to monitor its position relative to terrain.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was named 'Siv' and was the last of four C-130Js acquired by Norway between 2008 and 2010.
- 02The impact occurred just 20 meters below the summit of Sweden's highest mountain.
- 03The GPWS/TAWS was set to 'Tactical' mode, which suppressed terrain warnings.
- 04The crew was issued maps that lacked accurate terrain height data for Sweden.
- 05The aircraft was destroyed by impact, explosion, and fire, with debris passing over the mountain ridge.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Map Data Improvement
The Norwegian Air Force addressed the lack of cross-border terrain data to ensure crews have accurate maps when operating in neighboring countries.
ATC Training Review
Swedish authorities (LFV) reviewed controller training to ensure clearances are not issued below minimum safe altitudes in uncontrolled airspace unless specifically requested.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Missing Map Data Disclosure
Reference ↗In 2019, it was revealed that an internal Air Force investigation found the crew lacked accurate terrain maps for Sweden, a detail that was not explicitly highlighted in the original 2013 SHK accident report.