Investigation Summary
The accident originated from a mechanical failure that should have been manageable. During the takeoff roll, as the aircraft reached 158 knots and began rotation, a high-pressure turbine blade in the right-hand General Electric CF6-50C2 engine (Engine No. 3) separated. This caused an immediate loss of thrust. Standard operating procedures for transport-category aircraft dictate that if an engine fails after passing V1 (decision speed), the takeoff must be continued, as there is insufficient runway remaining to stop safely. In this instance, the aircraft was already airborne at approximately 9 feet when the captain initiated the abort. The DC-10 struck the runway with a vertical force of 2.1 Gs, causing the landing gear to eventually collapse as it exited the paved surface. The aircraft traveled 620 meters beyond the runway end, crossing a ditch and a road. The fuselage broke into three sections and was consumed by a post-crash fire. Investigators found that the failed turbine blade had been in service for 6,182 cycles, exceeding the manufacturer's recommended replacement interval of 6,000 cycles.
Final Conclusions
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (AAIC) concluded that the primary cause was the captain's inadequate judgment in electing to abort the takeoff after the aircraft had already lifted off and exceeded V1. A significant contributing factor was the failure of the airline's maintenance and flight operation departments to coordinate and adhere to service recommendations, which led to the operation of an engine with turbine blades past their recommended service life (AAIC Report 97-6).
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Breaking Point | Garuda Indonesia Flight 865 — A detailed look at the 1996 Fukuoka crash where a DC-10 crew attempted to reject a takeoff after rotation following an engine failure.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Systems & Failure Modes
General Electric CF6-50C2 Engines
The DC-10 is powered by three turbofans. The number 3 engine (right wing) suffered a high-pressure turbine blade separation due to metal fatigue. The failed blade had operated for 30,913 hours and 6,182 cycles, exceeding the manufacturer's recommended 6,000-cycle limit.
Ground Spoilers and Thrust Reversers
These systems were deployed during the abort sequence to provide aerodynamic and reverse-thrust braking, but were insufficient to stop the aircraft within the remaining runway length.
Interesting Facts
- 01The failed turbine blade had operated for 6,182 cycles, exceeding the 6,000-cycle limit recommended by General Electric.
- 02The aircraft was a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 named 'Kalimantan'.
- 03The three fatalities were passengers seated in 34K, 35K, and 35J.
- 04The aircraft overran the runway by 620 meters, crossing a ditch, a fence, and a road.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Maintenance Coordination Review
The investigation highlighted the need for better coordination between maintenance and flight operations to ensure manufacturer service recommendations (such as turbine blade replacement cycles) are strictly followed.