Investigation Summary
The investigation into Flight 1713 highlighted a critical breakdown in both operational procedures and crew resource management. Due to a series of communication errors with Air Traffic Control, the flight crew taxied without clearance and later misunderstood instructions, leading to a significant delay at the runway threshold. During this 27-minute wait in active snowfall, the deicing fluid was diluted, allowing ice to accumulate on the upper wing surfaces. The DC-9-10 series was known to be particularly sensitive to wing contamination, which could significantly degrade lift and stall margins. This vulnerability was compounded by the 'green-on-green' crew pairing: the Captain had only 33 hours of command experience on the DC-9, and the First Officer had only 36 hours on the type. Furthermore, the First Officer had not flown in 24 days and had a documented history of training failures at previous employers that Continental was reportedly unaware of. During the takeoff, the First Officer rotated the nose at twice the recommended rate, which, combined with the ice-induced lift loss, led to an immediate and unrecoverable stall.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB determined the probable cause was the captain's failure to have the airplane deiced a second time after a delay before takeoff that led to upper wing surface contamination and a loss of control during rapid takeoff rotation by the first officer. Contributing factors included the absence of regulatory or management controls governing the pairing of newly qualified crew members (green-on-green crewing) and the confusion between the flight crew and air traffic controllers that led to the departure delay.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
The "Green on Green" Disaster | Continental Airlines Flight 1713 — A detailed look at the crash of Continental 1713, exploring how crew inexperience, weather delays, and wing contamination led to tragedy in Denver.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Only 33 hours as Captain on type.
First Officer
Had not flown for 24 days prior to the accident.
Systems & Failure Modes
Wing Deicing Fluid
Type I deicing fluid was used, which has a very short holdover time in active snow; the 27-minute delay exceeded the fluid's effectiveness.
DC-9 Wing Design
The DC-9-10 series lacked leading-edge slats, making the wing's lift characteristics extremely vulnerable to disruption by surface roughness like ice.
Interesting Facts
- 01The First Officer had been dismissed from a previous airline after failing three flight examinations.
- 02The Captain had only 166 hours on the DC-9, with only 33 of those as a Captain.
- 03The First Officer had only 36 hours of experience on the DC-9 and had not flown for 24 days prior to the accident.
- 04NTSB investigators found that nearly 3 minutes of non-pertinent social conversation occurred in the cockpit before takeoff.
- 05The DC-9-10 series wings were found to be highly sensitive to even small amounts of ice contamination.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Green-on-Green Crewing Restrictions
Continental Airlines developed a computerized program to prevent two pilots with fewer than 100 hours in type from being assigned to the same flight.
Sterile Cockpit Rule Reinforcement
The NTSB emphasized the dangers of non-pertinent conversation during critical phases of flight, leading to stricter enforcement of sterile cockpit procedures.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Wake Turbulence Claim
Reference ↗Continental Airlines initially argued that wake turbulence from a preceding flight caused the crash, but the NTSB dismissed this after calculating the separation time and vortex decay.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the wikipedia geotag.