Investigation Summary
The flight was a scheduled domestic service from Tehran to Mashhad. During the approach, the crew was asked to reduce speed for separation, leading the captain to perform an orbit. The final approach was characterized by excessive speed, recorded at 325 km/h on the glide path versus the recommended 275 km/h. The flight engineer engaged reverse thrust prematurely at 22 meters altitude without a command, then stowed them just before touchdown. The aircraft landed long and fast, leaving insufficient runway for deceleration. Post-touchdown, the flight engineer shut down the two inner engines (2 and 3) while applying forward thrust to the outer engines (1 and 4) instead of reverse, further hindering braking efforts. The presence of Aria Air's CEO in the cockpit was cited as a significant psychological factor that degraded the crew's professional discipline and decision-making.
Final Conclusions
The Iranian Civil Aviation Organization (CAO) concluded the main cause was weak cockpit management and the failure to use correct landing techniques, specifically regarding the mismanagement of engine thrust reversers and spoilers. Contributory factors included the flight engineer and co-pilot acting without PIC coordination, the crew's failure to respond to EGPWS warnings, and the adverse psychological effect caused by the CEO's presence in the cockpit. The investigation also noted that the crew lacked proper training for Iranian flight conditions and had poor English language proficiency. A significant breakdown in communication was noted when the crew had a disagreement regarding a 'Go around' maneuver during the unstable approach, which was ultimately not performed. Furthermore, it was discovered that DETA Air had failed to follow proper procedures for engine life-time extensions with Ukrainian authorities, resulting in unauthorized extensions for engines 1, 2, and 4.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
The Disaster of Aria Air Flight 1525 — A detailed look at the high-speed runway overrun of an Ilyushin Il-62 in Iran, exploring the CRM failures and technical errors that led to the crash.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
First Officer
Systems & Failure Modes
Thrust Reversers
Mechanical systems on engines 1 and 4 used to redirect thrust forward to decelerate. They were mismanaged by the flight engineer, who applied forward thrust instead of reverse after touchdown.
Spoilers
Aerodynamic surfaces on the wings used to dump lift and increase drag; the investigation found they were not used correctly to reduce speed.
EGPWS
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System; the crew reportedly ignored warnings generated by the system during the unstable approach.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was an Ilyushin Il-62M built in 1989 (MSN 1951525) and leased from DETA Air.
- 02The airframe had a extensive registration history including DDR-SEY, D-AOAM, UK-86578, and UN-86509 before becoming UP-I6208.
- 03Of the 16 fatalities, 13 were crew members and 3 were passengers; the high crew death toll was due to the total destruction of the cockpit and forward cabin up to the 6th row.
- 04Among the fatalities was Aria Air CEO Mehdi Dadpay, who was present in the cockpit during the landing.
- 05The aircraft hit the perimeter wall 520 meters past the end of the runway stop way.
- 06The flight engineer was not wearing a headset, which hindered coordination with the rest of the crew.
- 07The aircraft's Air Operators Certificate was suspended immediately following the accident.
- 08The investigation found that the total number of persons on board did not match the aircraft's written load sheet.
Safety Actions & Advisories
AOC Suspension
The Iranian Civil Aviation Organization suspended Aria Air's Air Operator Certificate following the accident.
CRM Training Mandate
The report emphasized the need for improved Cockpit Resource Management training and stricter adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).