Investigation Summary
The flight departed Lima at 10:09 local time, deviating from the company's authorized route manual by continuing on a runway heading for 30 nautical miles before turning east toward the Andes. At 10:24, the crew cancelled their IFR clearance to proceed VFR at FL195, despite weather reports indicating overcast conditions that would make visual operations impossible at their destination and alternates. As the aircraft entered areas of high moisture and freezing temperatures, the navigator and co-pilot noted the formation of ice on the airframe. However, the crew did not activate the engine anti-ice systems until after significant accretion had occurred. At 10:41, both Ivchenko AI-24VT engines flamed out simultaneously after ingesting shed ice. The propellers automatically moved to the feathered position. In the ensuing emergency, the captain initiated a 30 degree bank turn to the right to aim for a valley, which increased the rate of descent and reduced the time available for an engine relight. Although the flight engineer managed to initiate a restart on the number 2 engine seconds before impact, it was insufficient to maintain flight. The aircraft struck the mountain, bounced, and was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
Final Conclusions
The Peruvian Commission for the Investigation of Aviation Accidents (CIAA) concluded in report CIAA-ACCID-006-2012 that the primary cause was the sudden shutdown of both engines due to the crew's incorrect use of the anti-ice system in adverse weather. Contributory factors included deficient flight planning, poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) in monitoring ice accretion, and a lack of specific simulator training for dual-engine failures and icing detection. The investigation also noted that the aircraft's checklist lacked specific procedures for responding to the 'ICE' warning light or for the simultaneous restart of both engines.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Age 56
First Officer
Age 33
Flight Engineer
Age 38
Navigator
Age 35
Systems & Failure Modes
Anti-Ice System
Designed to prevent ice buildup on engine inlets and airframe; the crew failed to activate this system before entering icing conditions.
Ivchenko AI-24VT Engines
Twin turboprop engines that suffered simultaneous flameouts due to the ingestion of ice crystals and shed ice.
GPWS
The Ground Proximity Warning System provided multiple alerts, but the aircraft's rate of descent after the dual engine failure made impact unavoidable.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was an Antonov An-26-100 built in 1978 with over 7,000 airframe hours.
- 02The captain had 13,145 total flight hours, with 3,025 hours on the An-24/An-26 type.
- 03Both engines flamed out because the anti-ice system was not activated until after ice had already accumulated.
- 04The wreckage was located the following day scattered over 2.5 square kilometers.
- 05The crew deviated from the company's approved route manual shortly after takeoff.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Checklist Revision
The investigation recommended updating the aircraft checklist to include specific procedures for when the 'ICE' light is illuminated.
Training Enhancement
Recommendations were made to improve simulator training to include scenarios for dual engine failure and landing with no operative engines.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Discrepancies in Crew Experience Records
Reference ↗There are conflicting records regarding the flight experience of the crew. While the BAAA database lists the Captain as having 12,308 hours on type, the CIAA final report summary cited by Wikipedia indicates 3,025 hours on type. Similarly, the First Officer's type-specific experience is variously reported as 20 hours or 1,193 hours.