Investigation Summary
The accident sequence began when the aircraft was struck by lightning while climbing through 8,900 feet, causing a transition of the flight control system to DIRECT mode. This mode removes the flight envelope protections and automatic trim functions of the fly-by-wire system, requiring high pilot proficiency in manual handling. The captain elected to return to Sheremetyevo immediately. During the final approach, the aircraft was overweight and slightly fast. As the captain flared, he made large, alternating sidestick inputs that induced a 'pilot-induced oscillation' or porpoising. The aircraft bounced three times; the second impact recorded a vertical load of 5.85g, and the third exceeded 5g. These forces caused the landing gear weak links to shear and the gear assemblies to collapse into the wing structure, rupturing fuel lines. The resulting fire was instantaneous and catastrophic, fueled by a large volume of spilled fuel and the jet blast of the engines, which the crew failed to shut down promptly after the third impact, significantly intensifying the blaze.
Final Conclusions
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) final report concluded the primary cause was the captain's uncoordinated and disproportionate control inputs during the flare and bounced landing, characterized by extreme sidestick movements that induced porpoising. Contributing factors included the ineffectiveness of Aeroflot's pilot training for DIRECT MODE operations and a failure of the airline's Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) system to identify the captain's systematic longitudinal control errors in previous flights. The investigation highlighted the captain's significant psycho-emotional stress and psychological fixation on an 'urgent' landing, which prevented a go-around despite multiple windshear warnings and the initial bounce. While the landing gear 'weak links' functioned as designed, the IAC noted a lack of correlation between certification standards for gear strength and fuel tank integrity, as the tanks ruptured despite the gear separating as intended. Fire modeling by EMERCOM determined that while the flight attendant's decision to open the rear left door was technically an error, it did not increase the fire's damaging effects or influence the severity of the outcome, as the fire had already penetrated the cabin through windows that lacked external fire resistance standards.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
A Routine Flight Turns into Every Pilot's Nightmare — A detailed breakdown of Aeroflot Flight 1492, covering the lightning strike, the transition to DIRECT mode, and the fatal bounced landing at Sheremetyevo.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Denis Yevdokimov
First Officer
Maksim Kuznetsov
Systems & Failure Modes
DIRECT MODE
A degraded flight control law where the pilot has direct control over surface deflections without computer-aided stability or envelope protection.
Landing Gear Weak Links
Structural fuses designed to break under specific loads to prevent the gear from puncturing the fuel tanks; they functioned but the impact energy was too high.
Predictive Windshear System
Aural warnings triggered during approach which the crew ignored, despite the airline's manual requiring a go-around.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was only two years old at the time of the accident.
- 0240 of the 41 fatalities died from thermal injuries and inhalation of hot air rather than the impact itself.
- 03The fatalities included 40 passengers and one crew member, flight attendant Maksim Moiseev, who was attempting to assist passengers in the rear.
- 04Two children were among the 41 fatalities.
- 05The second impact reached a vertical load of 5.85g, far exceeding certification limits.
- 06Automatic spoiler deployment is inhibited in DIRECT mode, and the crew failed to deploy them manually.
- 07Passenger statements confirmed that some individuals stopped to retrieve luggage, obstructing the evacuation.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Pilot Training Revision
Recommendations were made to improve Aeroflot's training for manual piloting in DIRECT mode and to emphasize the necessity of a go-around after a bounced landing.
Certification Review
The IAC called for a review of the correlation between landing gear strength requirements and fuel tank integrity during high-energy impacts.