Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during the second takeoff of a test session aimed at certifying the A330's autopilot for Category III standards. The aircraft was configured with a center of gravity at 42 percent, near its aft limit, using water ballast. Although the test procedure specified a reduced 'Flex 49' thrust setting, the crew utilized maximum Takeoff/Go-Around (TOGA) power. This increased the thrust asymmetry when the captain simulated a failure of the number one engine by idling the throttle and tripping a hydraulic circuit breaker. As the aircraft climbed, the autopilot, which had been left with a 2,000-foot altitude target from a previous flight phase, transitioned into altitude acquisition mode. Because the autopilot lacked pitch attitude protection in this specific mode, it commanded a steep pitch-up to reach the target altitude. The pitch reached 32 degrees, causing airspeed to decay to 100 knots, well below the minimum control speed of 118 knots. The resulting thrust asymmetry caused a severe left roll. Although the captain eventually reduced power on the remaining engine to regain symmetry and pushed the nose down, the aircraft was at too low an altitude to recover from the dive.
Final Conclusions
The Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA) concluded that the crash resulted from a combination of factors. Primary causes included the choice of TOGA thrust instead of Flex 49, the extreme aft center of gravity, and a trim setting of 2.2 degrees nose-up which, while within limits, was inappropriate for the aft CG. The investigation also highlighted the captain's fatigue following a demanding schedule, a lack of a formal pre-flight briefing, and the autopilot's transition to altitude acquisition mode without pitch protection. The crew's overconfidence in the aircraft's automated systems and a delayed reaction to the decaying airspeed were also cited as contributing factors.
Video Analysis
The Test Flight That Went Horribly Wrong | Airbus Industrie Flight 129 — A detailed look at the 1994 crash of an Airbus A330 during a certification test flight in Toulouse, examining how a series of small errors and autopilot mode confusion led to a fatal stall.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Airbus Chief Test Pilot Nick Warner
First Officer
Air Inter training captain Michel Cais
Systems & Failure Modes
Autopilot Altitude Acquisition Mode
A mode designed to capture a pre-selected altitude. In this accident, the mode lacked pitch attitude protection, allowing the aircraft to reach a dangerous 32-degree nose-up attitude.
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS)
The aircraft was trimmed to 2.2 degrees nose-up, which exacerbated the pitch-up tendency caused by the aft center of gravity and high thrust.
Speed Reference System (SRS)
A flight guidance mode that manages pitch during takeoff to maintain a safe speed; the autopilot transitioned out of this mode into altitude acquisition during the climb.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was only 259 days old and had flown 360 total airframe hours.
- 02The center of gravity was set to 42% for the test, which is near the extreme aft limit.
- 03The minimum control speed for the configuration was 118 knots, but the aircraft slowed to 100 knots.
- 04The seven fatalities included three crew members and four passengers: two Alitalia pilots (Alberto Nassetti and Pier Paolo Racchetti) and two Airbus executives (Philippe Tournoux and Keith Hulse).
- 05The aircraft was being flight-tested under an agreement with Thai Airways International, the intended owner.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Autopilot Logic Revision
Airbus modified the autopilot logic to ensure pitch attitude protection is maintained during altitude acquisition modes to prevent excessive nose-up attitudes.
Test Flight Safety Procedures
Procedures for flight testing were tightened to ensure more rigorous pre-flight briefings and to limit the number of non-essential personnel on board during high-risk maneuvers.