Investigation Summary
The flight was plagued by delays from the start, beginning with engine repairs in Moscow and followed by a weather hold in Omsk. By the time the aircraft reached Alma-Ata, the weather had deteriorated significantly. A preceding Il-18 pilot had explicitly warned controllers that landing was unsafe, yet the operations manager reversed a diversion order and cleared Flight 101 for the approach. During the final stages, the cockpit environment was compromised by the presence of Rishat Azakov, the Head of the Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate. Azakov had already worked 15 hours that day and lacked a current medical certificate, yet he took an active role in the landing. When the controller finally issued a go-around command due to visibility dropping to 800 meters, the crew hesitated. The navigator and Azakov claimed to see lights, leading the captain to abandon his instruments to search for visual cues. This loss of situational awareness resulted in the aircraft drifting off course and impacting the ground at 300 km/h.
Final Conclusions
The primary causes were the controller's decision to dispatch the flight into weather below minimums without providing updated METAR data, and the crew's failure to execute a timely missed approach. The presence of an unauthorized, fatigued senior official on the flight deck created a breakdown in standard operating procedures, as the captain waited for the official's command to go around rather than following the controller's instructions.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Systems & Failure Modes
Non-Directional Beacon (NDB)
The crew used pulsed beacon lights for visual reference, but lost sight of them during the final descent.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
The aircraft was established on the glidepath 8.5 km from the runway but deviated during the visual transition.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft had accumulated 6,802 flight hours prior to the accident.
- 02Visibility at the time of the crash was 800 meters, which was below the airport's published minimums.
- 03The Head of the Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate was on the flight deck despite having worked 15 hours that day.
- 04The controller failed to relay critical METAR weather updates at 20:00, 20:15, and 20:30.
- 05The aircraft struck the ground at a speed of 300 km/h.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Weather Reporting Compliance
The investigation highlighted the critical failure of METAR reporting during deteriorating conditions, leading to stricter requirements for timely weather updates to crews on approach.
Flight Deck Authority
The accident reinforced regulations regarding the presence of unauthorized personnel on the flight deck, particularly those in senior management roles who might influence pilot decision-making.