Investigation Summary
The sequence of events began at the gate when the First Officer entered runway 27R into the Flight Management Computer (FMC) instead of the assigned 27L. Although the error was noticed during taxi, the subsequent correction was incomplete: the crew failed to re-enter the FLEX temperature or upload new V-speeds for the correct runway. This invalidated the FMC's takeoff performance data. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft's systems could not reconcile the FLEX thrust lever position with the missing performance data, triggering an 'ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET' ECAM message and a level two caution chime. The Captain ignored the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to move the levers to TO/GA, which would have resolved the alert. As the aircraft reached 86 knots, a 'RETARD' aural alert—normally reserved for landing—began to sound continuously. The crew continued the roll without V-speed callouts until 164 knots. After the nosewheel left the ground, the Captain suffered a loss of situational awareness and decided to abort, despite being well past V1. The resulting erratic pitch inputs and thrust reduction caused the aircraft to slam back onto the runway, striking its tail and collapsing the nose gear.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB determined the probable cause was the captain's decision to reject the takeoff after the airplane had rotated. Contributing factors included the flight crew's failure to follow SOPs regarding FMC configuration and the captain's failure to respond correctly to the ECAM 'thrust not set' alert. The investigation also highlighted poor Crew Resource Management (CRM), as the First Officer failed to challenge the Captain's deviations from procedure, and the Captain exhibited self-induced pressure to continue a flawed takeoff until a late-stage panic led to the unsafe abort.
Video Analysis
US Airways Flight 1702 Rejected Takeoff and Nose Gear Collapse — An analysis of the 2014 accident in Philadelphia where an Airbus A320 crashed after a late rejected takeoff. The investigation highlights flight management computer errors and the decision to abort after rotation.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Underwent a medical procedure involving sedatives 45 hours before the flight; toxicology found Fentanyl and Midazolam.
First Officer
Pilot Monitoring; failed to make 80-knot and V-speed callouts.
Systems & Failure Modes
FMC (Flight Management Computer)
The crew failed to properly re-initialize takeoff data after changing the runway, leading to a lack of V-speeds on the PFD.
ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring)
Triggered a 'thrust not set' alert because the thrust levers were in the FLEX detent without a corresponding FLEX temperature in the computer.
FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control)
The system automatically increased thrust to TO/GA levels 8 seconds after the initial alert, despite the levers remaining in the FLEX position.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft reached a maximum speed of 167 KIAS, which was 10 knots above the calculated V1 speed of 157 KIAS.
- 02The 'RETARD' alert, which confused the crew, is designed to trigger at 20 feet radio altitude during landing to prompt thrust reduction.
- 03Post-accident toxicology found the Captain had Fentanyl and Midazolam in his system from a medical procedure 45 hours prior, though he was required to wait 60 hours before flying.
- 04The aircraft slid approximately 2,000 feet down the runway before coming to rest near taxiway S10.
- 05Evacuation was complicated by the nose gear collapse, which prevented the 2L slide from reaching the ground, and smoke, which blocked the 2R exit.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Thrust Lever Procedure Update
US Airways issued a bulletin to the pilot handbook clarifying that moving thrust levers to the TO/GA detent will cancel the 'RETARD' aural alert if it occurs during takeoff.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Pilot Impairment
Reference ↗An internal FAA report noted the Captain had Fentanyl and Midazolam in his system from a stress test two days prior, suggesting he was not fit for duty, though the NTSB focused primarily on procedural errors.