Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during a scheduled multi-stop flight from New York to San Francisco. During the leg from Denver to Salt Lake City, the flight crew attempted to expedite their arrival. The captain, Gale C. Kehmeier, allowed the aircraft to descend at approximately 2,300 feet per minute, nearly triple the recommended rate. Despite being 2,000 feet above the glideslope at the outer marker, the captain maintained a high sink rate to reach the runway. When the First Officer attempted to advance the thrust levers to arrest the descent, the captain physically brushed his hands away, stating 'Not yet.' Power was finally applied only seconds before impact, which was too late to overcome the engines' spool-up time. The aircraft struck the ground 335 feet short of the runway with a force of 4.7g, causing the landing gear to collapse and rupture internal fuel lines. While the impact was survivable, the resulting fire trapped and killed 43 passengers.
Final Conclusions
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) determined the probable cause was the captain's failure to take timely action to arrest an excessive descent rate. Contributing factors included the captain's 'checkered' training history, including previous failures in jet transition and instrument proficiency checks. The investigation also highlighted the vulnerability of rigid fuel lines and the placement of cabin crew away from emergency exits, which delayed the evacuation.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Flight 227 crashes on Salt Lake City airport runway killing 43 passengers in 1965 — Archival news footage from KSL reporting on the crash of United Flight 227, including eyewitness accounts and early details of the disaster.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Gale C. Kehmeier, age 47. Had a checkered training history, including failures in jet transition and instrument proficiency checks.
First Officer
Philip E. Spicer, age 39.
Second Officer
Ronald R. Christensen, age 28.
Systems & Failure Modes
Pratt & Whitney JT8D-1 Engines
The engines required several seconds to spool up from idle to approach power, a delay the captain failed to account for during the steep descent.
Fuel Lines
Rigid metal fuel lines in the fuselage ruptured when the landing gear collapsed, allowing pressurized fuel to spray into the cabin.
Landing Gear
The main landing gear failed under the 4.7g impact load, with the right gear thrusting upward into the fuselage.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was only seven months old at the time of the accident.
- 02All 43 fatalities were caused by the post-impact fire and smoke inhalation, not the impact itself.
- 03The descent rate of 2,300 feet per minute was approximately triple the recommended rate.
- 04The impact force was measured at 4.7g, which exceeded the design strength of the landing gear.
- 05The Captain had previously failed his initial jet transition training and a routine instrument check.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Flexible Fuel Line Mandate
The FAA added 14 CFR 25.993(f), requiring fuel lines within the fuselage to be designed to allow deformation and stretching without leakage during a crash.
Flight Attendant Seating
Standard practice was changed to require flight attendants to be seated near emergency exits during takeoff and landing to facilitate rapid evacuations.
Jet Transition Training
The accident highlighted the need for more rigorous training for pilots transitioning from piston-engine aircraft to less-forgiving jet aircraft.