Investigation Summary
The flight was a short repositioning leg from Philadelphia to Teterboro. Despite company policy rating the First Officer as 'SIC-0' (meaning he was prohibited from acting as Pilot Flying), the Captain allowed him to handle the controls. The crew failed to conduct any approach briefings or use checklists, leading to significant confusion regarding their position and the approach sequence. As they were vectored for the ILS Runway 6 approach with instructions to circle to Runway 1, the crew became task-saturated. They failed to begin the circling maneuver at the designated point (VINGS intersection), continuing toward Runway 6 instead. When they finally attempted to salvage the approach with a steep, low-altitude turn to align with Runway 1, the airspeed decayed. The aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall and rolled nearly 90 degrees right before impacting a building and parking lot.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB determined the probable cause was the flight crew's attempt to salvage an unstabilized approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. Contributing factors included the captain's decision to allow an underqualified first officer to fly, the crew's failure to use standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the operator's lack of safety management systems. The NTSB also highlighted the FAA's inadequate oversight of Part 135 charter operators with known performance deficiencies.
Video Analysis
Crash of Trans-Pacific Air Charter Flight N452DA at Teterboro Airport — Analysis of the 2017 Learjet 35A crash caused by an unstabilized circle-to-land maneuver and cockpit resource management failures. The investigation highlights pilot error and unauthorized flight control by the first officer.
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Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Pilot Monitoring at time of crash. Had 353 hours as PIC in type.
First Officer
Pilot Flying at time of crash. Rated SIC-0, prohibited from flying by company policy.
Systems & Failure Modes
Stall Warning System
The Learjet 35A is equipped with a stick shaker and stick pusher to prevent aerodynamic stalls; these activated seconds before impact.
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
The CVR captured the crew's lack of professional discipline, including the use of profanity and the absence of required checklists.
Interesting Facts
- 01The First Officer had failed his private pilot checkride twice and had crashed during a simulator session eight months prior.
- 02The Captain had been previously flagged by an instructor as 'not yet proficient' in circling approaches.
- 03The aircraft rolled past 90 degrees, reaching a bank angle of approximately 110 degrees right just before impact.
- 04Trans-Pacific Air Charter had no check airmen qualified to fly the Learjet 35A at the time of the accident.
- 05The flight lasted only 25 minutes from takeoff to impact.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Part 135 Safety Management
Source ↗The NTSB recommended that the FAA require all Part 135 operators to implement formal Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programs.
Leadership Training
The NTSB recommended the development of leadership and command training specifically for Part 135 Pilots-in-Command to improve cockpit authority and SOP compliance.