Investigation Summary
The accident occurred during a ferry flight with only eight crew members on board. The approach to runway 19 was conducted in challenging weather conditions, including snow and crosswind gusts up to 29 knots. The aircraft touched down approximately 1,000 meters past the threshold at 230 km/h. Due to the crosswind and a slight roll, only the left landing gear made firm contact initially. On the Tu-204, the thrust reversers and automatic spoilers are interlocked with 'weight-on-wheels' switches that require both main gear struts to be compressed. When the crew moved the thrust levers to the maximum reverse position, the interlock prevented the reverser buckets from deploying. Consequently, the engines responded to the high throttle setting by producing forward thrust, increasing the aircraft's speed from 205 km/h back up to 240 km/h. The crew made a second unsuccessful attempt to engage reverse thrust while the aircraft bounced between the left and right gear. The wheel brakes also failed to engage as they were similarly dependent on the compression signals. The aircraft exited the runway 32 seconds after touchdown, crossed a ditch, and struck the M3 highway embankment, where the fuselage broke into three sections.
Final Conclusions
The Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) concluded that the primary cause was the failure of the thrust reverser and braking systems to activate due to the lack of a 'weight-on-wheels' signal from the right landing gear strut. This was exacerbated by the crew's decision to apply maximum reverse thrust when the interlock had not cleared, which led to an unintended increase in forward thrust. The investigation also noted that a similar overrun had occurred with another Red Wings Tu-204 just nine days prior, highlighting a known issue with the reliability of the landing gear limit switches.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Gennady Dmitrievich Shmelev, aged 58. Fatal.
First Officer
Evgeny Ivanovich Astashenkov, aged 52. Fatal.
Flight Engineer
Igor Nikolaevich Fisenko, aged 54. Fatal.
Systems & Failure Modes
Thrust Reverser Interlock
A safety system requiring simultaneous compression of both main landing gear struts to allow reverser deployment; failure to meet this condition caused the engines to produce forward thrust at high throttle settings.
Landing Gear Limit Switches
Sensors located on the shock absorbers that signal the aircraft's 'weight-on-wheels' status to the braking and spoiler systems.
Automatic Spoilers
Systems designed to deploy upon touchdown to dump lift and increase wheel braking effectiveness, which failed to activate automatically during this event.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a Tupolev Tu-204-100B built in 2008.
- 02The crash was captured on video by a dashcam in a car traveling on the M3 highway.
- 03A similar non-fatal overrun involving the same airline and aircraft type occurred at Novosibirsk nine days earlier.
- 04The Tu-204 design prevented thrust reverser deployment unless both main gear struts were compressed.
- 05The cockpit section completely detached from the fuselage upon impact with the ravine slope.
- 06Debris from the aircraft struck a vehicle on the M3 highway, injuring the driver, Georgiy Zhidenko.
- 07The crosswind component at the time of landing was 11.5 m/s, near the aircraft's maximum limit of 11.7 m/s.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Airworthiness Directive (Rosaviatsia)
Source ↗Following a similar incident on December 20, 2012, authorities mandated the inspection and extra lubrication of braking system drive mechanism limit switches on all Tu-204 aircraft before their next departure.
Manufacturer Notification
Source ↗On December 28, 2012, Rosaviatsia formally notified Tupolev that malfunctioning brakes caused the previous Red Wings Tu-204 overrun at Novosibirsk, urging a review of the system design.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Prior Knowledge of System Defects
Reference ↗Rosaviatsia had issued a mandatory Airworthiness Directive just five days before the crash, following a similar overrun in Novosibirsk, requiring all Tu-204 operators to lubricate landing gear limit switches. The fact that RA-64047 suffered the exact same failure suggests either the directive was not effectively implemented or the underlying design flaw was more significant than a lubrication issue.