Investigation Summary
The flight arrived at Adams Field and was marshaled to a stop at gate 7. Although ground crews noted that ATR aircraft sometimes shut down the left engine during taxi to facilitate baggage removal, this specific aircraft had a known maintenance discrepancy. The number 1 DC generator was inoperative, and per Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 24-30-01A, single engine taxi was prohibited. This restriction exists because losing the remaining generator during a single engine taxi would result in a 'Basic Electrical Power' configuration, causing a loss of normal aircraft braking. Consequently, both engines and their respective propellers were still rotating when the aircraft reached the ramp. The station manager, who was assisting the arrival as the left wing walker, moved from behind the left wing toward the nose. Witnesses observed him preoccupied with a radio and looking up at the terminal building. He failed to maintain clearance from the left propeller, resulting in fatal contact. Investigators found he was not wearing hearing protection at the time of the accident. The station manager had received recurrent training on January 10, 1998, which included familiarization with the ATR 42-300/500, BE1900, and Embraer 120 aircraft, as well as ramp safety and emergency procedures. Toxicology tests initially showed a blood alcohol level of 0.035g%, but this was determined by medical examiners to be ethanol production from post-mortem decomposition rather than ingestion.
Final Conclusions
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause to be the station manager's inadvertent encounter with the rotating propeller due to his diverted attention. Contributing to the accident was the requirement to keep both engines running during taxi and standing operations due to a deferred maintenance item on the aircraft's electrical system.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
25-year-old male holding an Airline Transport certificate. Valid Class 1 medical.
Systems & Failure Modes
DC Generator
The aircraft was flying with the #1 DC generator inoperative. Under MEL requirements, this necessitated two-engine taxi operations to prevent a total loss of normal braking if the sole remaining generator failed.
Propeller Danger Area
A designated zone around the rotating blades where ground personnel are prohibited from entering while engines are running. For the ATR-42, this extends from the cockpit side to the wing trailing edge.
Interesting Facts
- 01The station manager had 31 years of experience in ground operations.
- 02The aircraft was operating under an MEL for an inoperative #1 DC generator, which prohibited single-engine taxi.
- 03The station manager was not wearing hearing protection at the time of the accident.
- 04Continental Express Alert Bulletin 92-3 defined the propeller danger area as extending from the cockpit to the wing trailing edge.
- 05Toxicology tests for the deceased were negative for drugs; ethanol detected (0.035g%) was attributed to post-mortem decomposition.
- 06The aircraft was operating as Jet Link flight 3402.
- 07The aircraft serial number was 512.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Propeller Danger Area Definition
Continental Express Alert Bulletin 92-3 (issued November 23, 1992) pictorially defined the propeller danger area for the ATR-42, extending from just aft of the cockpit to the trailing edge of the wing and outboard to the wing tips. The bulletin explicitly stated this area should never be entered while propellers are spinning.
Location
NO VERIFIED COORDINATES · Coordinates are the estimate published in the ntsb final report. No map is shown, because a marker here would imply a precision the record does not have.
Reported location: Little Rock, Arkansas, United States