Investigation Summary
The flight, carrying Air Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst as co-pilot, was under significant pressure to land at Heathrow for a scheduled press and VIP reception despite deteriorating weather. Three civilian Tu-104 aircraft had already diverted due to the conditions. While the Vulcan was equipped with an Instrument Landing System (ILS), it was not compatible with the specific ILS installation at Heathrow at that time, forcing a reliance on Ground Controlled Approach (GCA). During the descent, both pilots had the QNH set to 1017 millibars. The pilot, Squadron Leader Donald Howard, set a break-off height of 300 feet but continued to descend below this level without visual contact. Howard later stated he believed he was at 150 feet when he attempted to apply power, but the aircraft was actually much lower. The GCA controller failed to warn the crew that they had slipped below the glide path in the final seconds of the approach. The aircraft struck the ground, losing its main gear and damaging the elevator controls. Howard applied full power and the aircraft climbed to approximately 200 to 300 feet, but it became unresponsive. Howard ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft and ejected, followed by Broadhurst. The rear crew members (three RAF officers and one civilian technician, Frederick Bassett) had no ejection seats and were unable to escape via the manual exit door at such low altitude.
Final Conclusions
The RAF Court of Inquiry and a subsequent Ministry of Transport investigation concluded that the primary cause was the pilot's error in descending below the break-off height without visual reference. However, the inquiry also placed significant responsibility on the GCA controller for failing to provide elevation warnings during the final stages of the approach. The Secretary of State for Air stated in Parliament that while the pilot made an error of judgment, the failure of the GCA unit to warn the captain he was below the glide path was a 'principal cause' of the accident.
Video Analysis
The RAF Vulcan Disaster That Shocked Britain — A detailed look at the tragic flight of Vulcan XA897, which crashed at Heathrow in 1956, leading to a major controversy regarding the lack of ejection seats for rear crew members.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Systems & Failure Modes
Ground Controlled Approach (GCA)
A radar-based landing system where a ground controller provides verbal headings and descent instructions to the pilot. The controller failed to warn the crew they were below the glide path.
Ejection Seats
The Vulcan was designed with Martin-Baker ejection seats for the two pilots only. The lack of ejection seats for the rear crew (Navigators and AEO) remained a point of severe criticism for decades.
Interesting Facts
- 01XA897 was the first Vulcan B.1 delivered to the Royal Air Force.
- 02Only the pilot and co-pilot were equipped with ejection seats; the rear crew had to exit via a manual door.
- 03The aircraft was returning from a 26,000-mile tour of Australia and New Zealand.
- 04The pilot, Squadron Leader Howard, was making his first-ever GCA approach in a Vulcan.
- 05The crash occurred in front of a VIP welcoming party that included the pilots' wives.
Safety Actions & Advisories
GCA Procedure Review
The Ministry of Transport conducted an inquiry into GCA operations, leading to recommendations for better balancing azimuth and elevation monitoring by controllers.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Alleged Pressure to Land
Reference ↗Former RAF member Maurice Hamlin claimed Air Marshal Broadhurst ignored three orders to divert to avoid disappointing the waiting press and VIPs, though official records state Broadhurst told the pilot to divert if dissatisfied.
Rear Crew Ejection Seats
Reference ↗The accident highlighted the 'highly controversial' design choice to exclude ejection seats for the three rear crew members, a policy that was maintained despite this and subsequent fatal accidents.