Investigation Summary
The approach was conducted during Typhoon Doug, which produced winds up to 56 knots and heavy rain. On their second landing attempt, the crew selected a reduced flap setting (CONF3) due to the risk of windshear, which resulted in an approach speed that was higher than usual. During the final approach, the First Officer called out 'speed' twice to warn of the excessive velocity; the Captain acknowledged these calls but did not reduce speed. The actual touchdown occurred at 185 knots, significantly higher than the target speed of 147 knots. The aircraft also floated deep into the runway, touching down 1,773 meters from the threshold, leaving only 1,227 meters to stop. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data revealed a total breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM). As the aircraft descended through 30 feet, the First Officer, concerned by the high speed and sink rate, attempted to initiate a go-around by pulling back on the control yoke without declaring he was taking control. The Captain, determined to land, pushed forward on the yoke and engaged the thrust reversers. This resulted in a 'tug-of-war' where the aircraft's nose was being pulled up while the engines were in reverse thrust, preventing an effective go-around and simultaneously delaying effective braking. The aircraft exited the runway at 104 knots and struck a guard post and wall at 30 knots.
Final Conclusions
The accident was caused by the crew's failure to cooperate and the Captain's decision to continue a landing that had become unstable. Contributing factors included the First Officer's unauthorized attempt to take control and initiate a go-around without following standard procedures, and the Captain's disregard for the First Officer's valid warnings regarding speed and sink rate. The lack of standard English communication and poor CRM led to contradictory control inputs during the critical touchdown phase.
Video Analysis
CRASHED Seconds After Landing – Korean Air 2033 — A detailed breakdown of the CRM failure and typhoon conditions that led to the runway overrun of Korean Air 2033 in Jeju.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Systems & Failure Modes
Thrust Reversers
The Captain deployed the thrust reversers to stop the plane while the First Officer was simultaneously trying to lift the nose for a go-around, creating a dangerous and contradictory aerodynamic state.
GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System)
The system issued 'SINK RATE' warnings during the final approach, which the First Officer called out but the Captain failed to correct.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft touched down at 185 knots, which was 38 knots above the appropriate landing speed.
- 02The touchdown occurred 1,773 meters down the runway, leaving insufficient distance to stop.
- 03The First Officer attempted to initiate a go-around without using the standard 'I have control' declaration.
- 04The Captain and First Officer were briefly arrested by South Korean authorities following the accident on suspicion of negligence.
- 05The aircraft was less than four years old at the time of the hull loss.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Go-Around Policy Revision
A rule was established that if either pilot in the cockpit declares a go-around, the maneuver must be executed immediately regardless of the other pilot's opinion.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Criminalization of the Crew
Reference ↗Both pilots were arrested by South Korean authorities shortly after the crash on charges of negligence, a move that drew international attention to the criminalization of aviation accidents.