Investigation Summary
The investigation by the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (ECCAA) focused on the source of the water contamination and the pilot's response to the emergency. Investigators found that the right-hand fuel filler cap was of a design incompatible with the filler neck, creating a gap that allowed rainwater to bypass the seal. On the day of the accident, heavy convective showers dropped 40 mm of rain while the aircraft was stationary. Because the pilot did not perform a water drain check, the contamination went undetected. During the takeoff roll or shortly after rotation, the water was drawn into the fuel lines, causing the right Lycoming O-540 engine to lose power. The pilot, who had been described by a previous employer as having 'inconsistent' performance regarding airspeed and directional control, did not feather the right propeller. The resulting asymmetric drag, combined with a possible performance-reducing windshear, caused the aircraft to yaw and roll to the right. The stall warning activated and remained on until the aircraft cartwheeled into the ground.
Final Conclusions
The ECCAA Final Report (7AC/1/99) concluded the crash was caused by the presence of water in the right-hand fuel tank due to rainfall and filler cap anomalies, leading to engine failure shortly after takeoff. A primary factor was the pilot's failure to retain control of the aircraft after the power loss. Contributory factors included the omission of a pre-flight water drain check and the possible influence of windshear during the departure.
Video Analysis
The Flight That Ended in Seconds | FlyMontserrat Flight 107 — A look into the 2012 crash of a Britten-Norman Islander in Antigua, where a simple fuel cap issue and a missed pre-flight check led to a fatal engine failure.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Aged 31. Held a Commercial Pilot's Licence.
Systems & Failure Modes
Fuel Filler Cap
A critical seal that prevents environmental contaminants from entering the fuel tanks; in this case, an incorrect part allowed rainwater to enter the tank.
Propeller Feathering System
A manual or automatic system to turn propeller blades parallel to the airflow to reduce drag after an engine failure; the pilot failed to utilize this system.
Stall Warning System
An onboard system that alerts the pilot when the angle of attack is too high; the surviving passenger reported this remained active until impact.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft's Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) was 82.
- 02The right-hand fuel filler cap was incompatible with the filler neck, allowing water ingress.
- 03The right engine propeller was found in the unfeathered position after the crash.
- 04The pilot had 710 total flying hours, with 510 hours on the BN-2 Islander type.
- 05Approximately 40 mm of rain fell while the aircraft was on the ground before the accident flight.
- 06A pre-flight water drain check was not performed by the pilot.
Safety Actions & Advisories
EASA Airworthiness Directive
Source ↗EASA issued a directive requiring all Britten-Norman Islander operators to check for the installation of correct fuel filler caps.
Fuel Filter Assembly Recommendation
The UK AAIB, acting as technical advisors to the ECCAA, recommended that EASA require Islander aircraft to be equipped with fuel filter assemblies designed to minimize the likelihood of water entering the engines.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Pilot Performance History
Reference ↗The investigation revealed that the pilot's previous employer had noted 'inconsistent' performance regarding airspeed and directional control. This raised questions regarding the airline's vetting process and the pilot's ability to handle the emergency engine-out situation, as he failed to feather the propeller or maintain control speed.