Investigation Summary
The accident occurred at the end of a long flight that included two hours of holding in turbulent, high-workload conditions. During the second go-around, the aircraft was at a low weight, causing it to climb aggressively under takeoff thrust. The captain, likely suffering from fatigue and the 'pitch-up illusion' (somatogravic illusion) common in high-acceleration environments, perceived the aircraft's nose was too high. He responded by pushing the control column forward and, at an altitude of 900 meters, holding the stabilizer trim switch in the nose-down position for 12 seconds. This created a massive aerodynamic imbalance, shifting the stabilizer from -2.5 degrees to +2.5 degrees. The aircraft reached a peak altitude of approximately 1,000 meters before pitching down into a 45 to 50 degree dive. Despite the First Officer's attempts to intervene, the aircraft struck the runway at over 600 km/h.
Final Conclusions
The Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) concluded the crash was caused by incorrect aircraft configuration and piloting during the second go-around. Contributing factors included the captain's loss of situational awareness in nighttime IMC, a lack of psychological readiness for a second go-around, and operational tiredness. The captain's decision to continue the stabilizer nose-down trim for 12 seconds was a critical error, likely influenced by a somatogravic illusion. The investigation also noted that the airline's operations manual lacked specific criteria for recognizing psychological incapacitation, which prevented the First Officer from taking more decisive control of the aircraft.
Photographic Evidence (1)
Video Analysis
Flydubai Flight 981 Crash Analysis: Rostov-on-Don Airport — An analysis of the 2016 crash involving a Boeing 737-800, focusing on pilot spatial disorientation and somatogravic illusion during a missed approach in severe weather.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Aristos Sokratous, from Cyprus.
First Officer
Alejandro Álava Cruz, from Spain.
Systems & Failure Modes
Stabilizer Trim
The captain held the electric trim switch for 12 seconds, moving the horizontal stabilizer to a 2.5-degree nose-down position, causing a severe control imbalance.
Heads-Up Display (HUD)
An optional Rockwell-Collins HUD was active; investigators studied whether its display contributed to the captain's disorientation, though results were inconclusive.
Windshear Warning System
Onboard alerts triggered both go-arounds, forcing the crew to abandon stabilized approaches.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was a Boeing 737-800 delivered new to flydubai in 2010 (MSN 40241).
- 02Weather at the time included wind gusts up to 19 m/s (37 knots) and severe turbulence.
- 03The captain had over 6,000 total flight hours, with nearly 5,000 on the Boeing 737.
- 04The aircraft hit the ground with a negative vertical acceleration of -1g.
- 05The flight recorders were significantly damaged but successfully recovered and analyzed by the MAK.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Go-around Training Enhancement
Recommendations were made to improve pilot training for go-arounds from various altitudes and aircraft weights, specifically focusing on managing pitch-up moments.
Spatial Disorientation Awareness
The investigation emphasized the need for better training regarding somatogravic illusions during high-acceleration maneuvers like go-arounds.
Fatigue Risk Management
The report highlighted the impact of circadian rhythms and fatigue, leading to calls for stricter adherence to flight time limitations and rest requirements.