Investigation Summary
The accident originated from a last-minute aircraft substitution. The flight was originally scheduled for another DC-8 (N30UA), but N27UA was substituted after the primary aircraft was delayed. The Aeromar security guard overseeing the loading was unaware of the change and used the loading plan for the original aircraft. Furthermore, the cargo weight provided to the flight follower did not include the weight of the pallets and netting, leading to an underestimate of the total weight by approximately 6,000 pounds. Crucially, the cargo was loaded in a way that concentrated weight toward the rear, shifting the center of gravity (CG) to a point where the nose-up moment during rotation became unrecoverable. During the takeoff roll, the crew performed a standard elevator check at 80 knots. However, upon reaching rotation speed, the aircraft pitched up so aggressively that the captain was heard on the CVR saying 'easy, easy, easy, easy' in response to the rapid rotation. The aircraft reached a pitch angle of approximately 70 degrees, stalled, briefly recovered, and stalled again before impacting the ground. The NTSB also discovered that Fine Air and Aeromar employees attempted to cover up the misloading by destroying and hiding documentation in garbage receptacles following the crash.
Final Conclusions
The NTSB determined the probable cause was the failure of Fine Air to exercise operational control over the cargo loading process and the failure of Aeromar to load the airplane as specified. Contributing factors included the FAA's inadequate monitoring of Fine Air's operational control and its failure to ensure known cargo-related deficiencies were corrected. Fine Air and Aeromar eventually pleaded guilty to criminal charges related to the destruction of evidence and were fined approximately $5 million.
Video Analysis
Air Crash Investigation [English] - Deadly Pitch — A detailed look at the investigation into Fine Air Flight 101, exploring how cargo loading errors and corporate negligence led to the fatal crash in Miami.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Dale Patrick Thompson
First Officer
Steven Petrosky
Flight Engineer
Glen Millington
Systems & Failure Modes
Stabilizer Trim
Used to neutralize control column pressure; because the CG was miscalculated, the trim was set to a position that exacerbated the aircraft's natural tendency to pitch up.
Cargo Loading System
Consists of rails and retractable locks; investigators found that locks were frequently not engaged by ground crews, though they concluded a major cargo shift was not the primary cause of the initial pitch-up.
Flight Data Recorder
The NTSB noted safety issues regarding the loss of critical FDR information during the investigation.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was 29 years old at the time of the accident.
- 02The total airframe time was 48,825 hours with 41,688 cycles.
- 03One person on the ground, Renato Alvarez, was killed when the aircraft struck his car in a mini-mall parking lot.
- 04The NTSB found that the stabilizer trim was mis-set by at least 1.5 units nose-up due to incorrect CG calculations.
- 05Fine Air and Aeromar were fined $5 million after pleading guilty to covering up evidence.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Cargo Loader Training
Fine Air instituted a new training program for ground handlers covering aerodynamics, weight and balance, and the legal ramifications of incorrect pallet weights.
FAA Oversight
The NTSB issued 15 recommendations to the FAA to improve surveillance of cargo carrier operations and cargo loading control.
Known Controversies & Unanswered Questions
Criminal Evidence Tampering
Reference ↗Following the crash, FAA agents discovered flight documentation in garbage receptacles at Fine Air offices, leading to a criminal investigation into the destruction and covering-up of evidence by the airline and its ground handler.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the wikipedia geotag.