Investigation Summary
The flight was approximately 50 minutes behind schedule due to earlier delays. During the approach to Brest, the crew faced deteriorating weather with fog and a cloud base reported at 200 feet. While preparing for the ILS approach to Runway 26L, the captain selected the ILS frequency but neglected to press the 'APPR' button to arm the autopilot for capture. Consequently, the aircraft remained in 'Heading' and 'Vertical Speed' modes. A northwest wind caused the aircraft to drift left of the localizer, a deviation the crew failed to monitor as they focused on vertical navigation. When the captain eventually armed the approach mode, the aircraft was already below the glideslope, and no capture occurred. The crew continued the descent below the decision altitude without visual contact. At 93 feet radio altitude, the First Officer reported having no visual on the runway, and the Captain initiated a go-around. However, due to low airspeed and the aircraft's low altitude, it touched down in a grass field, struck a concrete wall and a pole, and caught fire.
Final Conclusions
The BEA concluded the accident resulted from the crew's failure to select the APPR mode at the start of the approach, leading to the non-capture of the ILS beams. Contributing factors included partial detection of flight path deviations due to a lack of cockpit coordination and a focus on vertical over horizontal navigation. The crew also failed to stabilize the approach before reaching the decision altitude. A change in strategy by the air traffic controller, who cleared the flight for approach earlier than the crew expected for the holding pattern, was also noted as a contributing factor.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Pilot Flying (PF)
First Officer
Pilot Not Flying (PNF)
Systems & Failure Modes
Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS)
The crew failed to arm the 'APPR' (Approach) mode, leaving the aircraft in 'Heading' and 'Vertical Speed' modes, which prevented automatic ILS capture.
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
The system provided multiple 'Glide Slope', 'Sink Rate', and 'Pull Up' warnings in the final 25 seconds of flight.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
The aircraft was equipped for Category II/III approaches, but the runway was temporarily restricted to Category I due to ongoing works.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was destroyed by a post-impact fire that entered the cabin through the left sidewalls.
- 02The evacuation was completed in less than one minute, aided by the light from the fire.
- 03A passenger seated in the center of the aircraft opened the left emergency exit; while it provided an escape route, it also allowed flames from the burning left wing to enter the cabin.
- 04The captain was the only occupant who did not survive the impact and subsequent fire.
- 05The aircraft was 450 meters left of the extended runway centerline at the time of impact.
Safety Actions & Advisories
BEA Recommendations
The BEA issued 13 recommendations to the DGAC and Brit Air focusing on crew coordination, approach stabilization criteria, and autopilot mode awareness.
Location
ACCIDENT SITE · Coordinates taken from the wikidata coordinate.