Investigation Summary
The investigation by the Grupo de Investigación de Accidentes Aéreos (GRIAA) revealed a systemic failure in operational safety. The Boeing 727-200 was not authorized to operate at Germán Olano Airport due to the runway's limited length (1,800 meters), yet Aerosucre had conducted these flights for years without regulatory intervention. On the day of the accident, the aircraft was estimated to be nearly a tonne over its maximum permissible takeoff weight for the specific conditions. The crew's performance was further compromised by the use of takeoff speed tables for a standard 727, failing to account for a flap system modification on HK-4544 that required different speeds. During the takeoff roll on Runway 07, the crew faced a 4-knot tailwind they had not properly assessed. They rotated the aircraft at a speed 5 knots higher than necessary and at a rate of only 1° per second, significantly slower than the recommended 2 to 3° per second. This combination of factors caused the aircraft to use the entire runway and 95 meters of grass before striking the perimeter fence and a shed. Although the plane managed to climb, the impact severed the 'A' hydraulic system lines and damaged the 'B' system. The crew failed to activate the standby hydraulic system, which might have provided enough control to prevent the final roll and impact.
Final Conclusions
The Colombian Aerocivil concluded the primary cause was inadequate flight planning and poor decision-making by both the operator and the crew. Specifically, the crew failed to perform accurate takeoff performance calculations, ignored tailwind limitations, and applied an erroneous rotation technique. Contributing factors included Aerosucre's non-compliance with aeronautical regulations by operating an unauthorized aircraft type at the airport, a lack of standardization in using modified flap speed tables, and the Aeronautical Authority's failure to supervise and halt these illegal operations over several years.
Video Analysis
No video analysis linked for this case file yet.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Jaime Cantillo, age 58.
First Officer
Mauricio Guzmán, age 39.
Flight Engineer
Pedro Duarte, age 72. Duarte was among the five fatalities.
Systems & Failure Modes
Hydraulic System
The aircraft suffered a total loss of pressure in the main hydraulic systems (A and B) due to impact damage. The crew failed to activate the standby hydraulic system, which is designed to provide emergency pressure for flight controls.
Flap System
The aircraft had a modified flap system, but the crew used speed reference tables for an unmodified aircraft, leading to an incorrect V-speed selection.
Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15
The number 3 engine (right side) failed immediately after the aircraft struck obstacles during the runway overrun.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was approximately 1,300 to 2,200 pounds over its maximum allowable takeoff weight for the 1,800-meter runway.
- 02An undocumented sixth person was on board the flight, who was not listed on the official manifest.
- 03The crew rotated the aircraft at 1° per second, which is significantly slower than the required 2-3° per second for a Boeing 727.
- 04The airport at Puerto Carreño was not officially approved for Boeing 727-200 operations.
- 05The right main landing gear was completely detached during the overrun after striking ground obstacles.
- 06The aircraft (MSN 21105/1158) was manufactured in 1975 and had previously served with Air Jamaica.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Regulatory Oversight Review
The investigation highlighted a severe lack of supervision by the Colombian Aeronautical Authority (Aerocivil), which had permitted unauthorized 727 operations at Puerto Carreño for years.