Investigation Summary
The flight crew requested an ILS approach to Runway 12 despite being advised of tailwind conditions and offered a circling approach to Runway 30. The crew opted for Runway 12 to avoid a circling approach with a low ceiling. During the final approach, the aircraft encountered heavy rain and a 14-knot tailwind, which was near the aircraft's 15-knot limit. The captain used the Head-Up Display (HUD) but the aircraft floated significantly, passing the normal touchdown zone. The throttles were not reduced to idle until 14 seconds after crossing the threshold, and the aircraft finally touched down 4,100 feet into the 8,911-foot runway. Despite the application of maximum manual braking and reverse thrust, the aircraft exited the runway at 62 knots ground speed.
Final Conclusions
The Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority (JCAA) concluded in its final report (JA-2009-09, issued May 2, 2014) that the primary cause was the aircraft touching down too far beyond the threshold to stop on the remaining runway. Contributing factors included the crew's decision to land on a wet runway with a significant tailwind, reduced situational awareness, and the failure to execute a go-around when the aircraft floated. The investigation also cited the crew's failure to use the maximum level of autobrake or flaps available, American Airlines' lack of specific training for tailwind landings, and the FAA's failure to mandate landing distance assessments with safety margins before every landing.
Video Analysis
Meters To Spare | American Airlines Flight 331 — A detailed look at the runway overrun of American Airlines Flight 331 in Kingston, Jamaica, exploring the factors of tailwinds and late touchdowns.
If playback is blocked, the owner has disabled embedding — use the link above.
Airframe & Maintenance
Crew Experience
Captain
Brian Cole, age 49.
First Officer
Daniel Billingsley, age 45.
Systems & Failure Modes
Head-Up Display (HUD)
The captain used the HUD during the approach and landing; investigators reviewed its role in the pilot's situational awareness during the long flare.
Autobrake System
The crew initially used Autobrake 3, but the captain overrode it with maximum manual braking when he realized the aircraft was not decelerating sufficiently.
Flight Data Recorder (FDR)
FDR data confirmed the late touchdown point and the timing of throttle reduction and brake application.
Interesting Facts
- 01The aircraft was carrying enough fuel for a round-trip flight back to the United States, increasing its landing weight.
- 02The runway at Kingston was not equipped with rain-dispersing grooves.
- 03The aircraft broke into three main sections upon impact with the terrain beyond the runway.
- 04The tailwind at touchdown was 14 knots, just below the airline's 15-knot limit.
- 05American Airlines provided each passenger $5,000 to compensate for lost or delayed baggage during the investigation.
- 06Some of the airport's approach lights were out of service at the time of the accident, though the JCAA determined the runway itself was properly lit.
Safety Actions & Advisories
Tailwind Landing Training
The NTSB and JCAA recommended that the FAA ensure pilot training programs include simulator sessions specifically for tailwind approaches and landings on wet runways.
Landing Distance Assessments
Investigators reiterated the need for commercial pilots to perform arrival landing distance assessments with a conservative safety margin before every landing.